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Statement of the Problem
Prison riots are integrated in the history of American corrections. Riots have
occurred for various reasons; as a result, several lives have been lost. The research in this
area has an early beginning in the history of corrections. Much of the violence is
demonstrated through inmates causing riots. Prison riots have involved several inmates,
threatened the security of the prison, and caused physical damage to both the inmate and
the prison. These riots have occurred as recently as January 1995. The riots began as
early as 1774. The first riot in this country occurred in Simsbury, Cormecticut, a mine-
shaft prison. Since then, over three hundred prison riots have erupted involving varying
degrees of violence from moderate fights and simple batteries to the use of dangerous
explosives and firearms (Dillingham and Montgomery, 1985). A prison riot can be
identified as a seizure by inmates of prison territory where they can move freely but staff
cannot, plus a presentation of demands that affect more inmates than those actively
participating in the disturbance (Wilsnack, 1976). Non-riot resistance involves similar
demands without seizure of territory; the demands are usually backed up by a refusal of
inmates to engage in some officially sanctioned activity (Wilsnack, 1976).
There is no single factor that significantly distinguishes institutions that experience
riots from those that do not. Even among those that did experience riots, no two riots are
found to be exactly alike. This problem is further complicated because many riots are
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spontaneous. However, by examining closely the situations prevailing prior to prison
riots, it is possible to identify some factors that riots have in common.
This study focuses on three major riots that received national attention. The three
riots were, (1) the Attica Prison Riot in New York State (September 8, 1971), (2) the
New Mexico Prison Riot in Santa Fe, New Mexico (February 2, 1980), and (3) the
Atlanta Riot at the Federal Penitentiary in Atlanta, Georgia (November 20, 1987).
Prison violence continues to be a pervasive problem in America's correctional
facilities and pose a substantial challenge to the contemporary judicial and correctional
process. Research on prison violence suggests that the complexity of prison violence
should be examined along the dimensions on which it varies: instrumental, expressive, or a
combination of both (Bowker, et. al., 1993). Instrumental violence is violence rationally
employed in the service of a goal, such as gaining wealth. Examples of this violence could
be strikes, work slowdowns, hunger strikes, and voluntary lock downs (staying in one's
cell even when the cell block is open), which are likely to have some collective goal such
as securing better food, safer working conditions, or protesting prison policies. On the
other hand, expressive violence is spontaneous, irrational and has no goal other than to
"blow off steam." Sometimes, excessive violence and instrumental violence may blend
together in the prison setting. A riot, for example, in which hostages are taken, could be
due to the rational calculations of a small group of aggressive inmates, yet could involve
the mistreatment ofhostages due to the fiustrations of inmates over poor conditions.
Another dimension of violence is the number of inmates involved. The number of
inmates may consist of a single inmate, a small group or gang, or a large aggregate
participating in a violent incident. The larger the number ofmen involved, the more their
actions take on the quality ofmass of collective behavior, in which the violence committed
is more likely to be expressive than instmmental (Bowker, 1978).
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Violent acts differ in the target of the violence. The most common acts of prison
violence, are self-inflicted violence and violence directed toward staff members. Self-
inflicted violence includes suicide and self-mutilation. Violence directed toward the staff
is relatively uncommon, but is made fearful by what seems to be its unpredictability. For
example, prison riots, although often appearing to be instrumental, are usually expressive,
making them difficult to control through reasoning. Many riots are directed toward staff
members, but most include a considerable amount of self-destructive behavior, such as
when inmates bum down their own recreational facility (Bowker, 1978).
In the traditional "conflict" culture, instmmental violence was used by some
inmates to keep other prisoners in line. The classic case was punishing a "snitch" for
having broken the code by "ratting" on another inmates. Violence in this setting is believed
to promote social order with the same justification that violence by the police in a fi-ee
society is used to maintain order. For the traditional prisoner, instmmental violence is
rational because the goals of the prison population are taken as a whole rather than
individually (Bowker, et al., 1978).
In the modem prison, there has been a great increase in expressive violence that
sometimes appears to be almost random. If there is any instmmental violence, it is
instmmental for an isolated individual. In a historical perspective, it may be seen that
prison subcultures have moved from potential violence as a basis for social organization
and control, to enacted violence that is either without systematic implications for social
control, or that has destmctive effects on prison social systems (Bowker, 1977). Some of
the factors that are related to prison violence are race relations, dmg abuse,
homosexuality, politicization, and prison overcrowding (Carroll, 1974).
The three major forms of prison violence includes homicide and suicide,
interpersonal violence and homosexual attacks, and prison riots (Fishman, 1934). Prison
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riots are the most violent and dangerous form of prison violence. In its extreme, a prison
riot can cause the most extensive damage to prison property and to the lives of inmates
and staff (Stojkovic and Lovell, 1992).
Because prison riots are the most feared form of prison violence, the magnitude
and ferocity ofmore recent prison riots have drastically increased. This is partially due to
the growing prison population and the overcrowded conditions in most state correctional
facilities. Historians of prison riots have identified several major waves of riots (and
disorders) in the twentieth century (Martin, 1953). The first wave coincided with the
World War I. It lasted 24 months, resulted in the loss of a few lives, and involved a
relatively small number of hostages. The first riot led to the introduction of proposals
such as providing counseling services, declining emphasis on regimentation, a harsh
disciplinary approach to management, and some improvement of inmates' living
conditions, which were all originally set forth in the American Prison Congress meeting in
Cincinnati in 1870 (Garson, 1972). This first wave ended in the year of 1915.
The second wave of prison riots occurred in 1929 and lasted for the same number
of years as the first wave. This wave of riots is linked to other prison riots. During the
month of July 1929, as many as 1,600 inmates in the Clinton Prison at Dannemora, New
York rioted because of overcrowding in the facility. Highway State Patrol Officers and
the United States National Guard killed three inmates. Several days following this riot,
the Auburn prison blew up. During this riot, an Auburn trusty injured a guard by throwing
acid in the guard's face. The trusty was able to secure the guard's keys and accessed the
arsenal that contained the facilities' weaponry. The weapons were distributed among the
inmates to gain control of the prison. The incident was planned by four inmates vrith an
escape plan. The inmates' escape led to a general riot, and several fires were set in at least
six prison shops; wrecking the prison. Inmates were eventually forced back into their
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cellblocks by the use of machine guns, rifles, and tear gas. Several lives were lost during
this riot; two inmates, three guards and, a firefighter. In addition to several lives being
lost, 12 inmates were wounded. This riot resulted in the rebuilding of the ancient Auburn
(Martin, 1953).
The Colorado State Prison Riot, Canon City, Colorado, was planned with the
same motive that was used at the Auburn prison. The attempted escape plan occurred one
year later. The riot began in the inmates' dining hall, where several inmates overpowered
the prison guards. Subsequently, the inmates in cellblock three were released. The
ringleaders seized guards as hostages and demanded the release of other inmates through
the gate. The warden refused the offer of the inmates. Because of the warden refusal, a
guard was shot and the body was thrown in the yard of the prison. The inmates eventually
surrendered through the use of tear gas, dynamite and machine guns. This riot resulted in
seven guards losing their lives and five inmates being injured.
The second wave of riots allowed inmates to finally receive diagnostic testing,
psychiatric treatment and counseling. This wave created an atmosphere for the attempt to
rehabilitate inmates. These reforms paved the way for community activist groups to
become more involved with prisoners rights.
The third wave of riots began in Utah from May through August 1951. This wave
began because of the low quality of food, hard labor, unfair treatment by the guards, poor
sanitary conditions, and the lack of educational and recreation programs. Several years
following this riot, riots began to occur in West Virginia, Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan,
New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Washington. The years 1952 and 1953 saw more than 45
riots involving over 21 states, most ofwhich stemmed from inmate dissatisfaction with the
methods of implementing rehabilitation programs (Barak-Glantz, 1990).
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A new wave of prison riots began in the Oregon Penitentiary in 1968. This riot is
noted for 22 hostages being held, five inmates losing their lives, 61 inmates being
wounded, and the prison being damaged. An estimate ofmore than 1,000,000 dollars was
calculated for the damage to the prison. The prison was retaken by the National Guard
after a hole was blown in the wall (Huff, 1982). The years following this riot increased
with continuous violence and injuries. An example to the continuous rioting occurred at
the Holmesburg Prison in Philadelphia. There were as many as 86 inmates that received
injuries. At the Cummings Prison in Arkansas, two hostages were held.
The year 1971 became a landmark for prison riots, when the State Prison at Attica
in New York State exploded. The level of violence and brutality reached its peak during
the New Mexico State Prison riot at Santa Fe in 1980. The Cuban riots in Atlanta,
Georgia and Oakdale, Louisiana penitentiaries in 1988 added further violence and physical
and property damage. Researchers believe that prison riots in Maryland and New York
may have caused the most serious disturbances in several decades. Reasons for the recent
1991 riots are as old as those for the second wave of prison riots; that being, poor living
conditions and food, and the institutions' lock-down policy which keeps inmates in their
cells 23 hours a day, allowing only one hour for supervised exercise.
Prison violence sometimes takes the form of collective action; and the prison riot
constitutes the most feared type of prison violence. Riots, like individuals, are sometimes
spontaneous outbursts; at other times they are planned in advance. A highly organized
inmate force held together by racial solidarity and political consciousness planned and
executed the famous Attica riot in 1971. To some considerable extent, it was a product of
the 1960s, a political protest against what was considered white oppression. Other riots
such as the New Mexico riot in 1980 were, spontaneous, disorganized outbursts (Colvin,
1982).
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Purpose and Scope of the Study
The purpose of this study is to compare three major prison riots. The riots being
compared are, the Attica Prison Riot in New York State, New Mexico Prison Riot in
Santa Fe, New Mexico and the Atlanta Prison Riot in the Federal Penitentiary in Atlanta,
Georgia. This study specifically addresses the following; Why and how did the prison
riots occur? Did the riots occur for similar reasons? Did prison officials adopt a planned
strategy to end the riots? Did these riots end with misleading promises to inmates? If so,
are they likely to reoccur?
A comparative study is desirable in order to delineate striking similarities among
prison riots. Research explains that no two prison riots occur for the same reasons.
However, several similarities between the riots may suggest the methods of predicting the
likelihood of prison riots occurring, as well as practical solutions to avoid riots.
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Organization of the Thesis
This thesis consists of four chapters. Chapter I addresses the statement of the
problem, prison violence issues, examines riots as a form of prison violence and outlines
the purpose and scope of the study. Chapter II consists of the review of the selected
literature on prison riots. Chapter III constitutes the comparative study of the three prison
riots, their causes, strategies and damages in an attempt to delineate striking similarities
among them. Chapter IV consists of the conclusion, recommendations and summary.
Several appendices are provided at the end ofChapter IV, followed by the bibliography.
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CHAPTER n
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The review of the literature in this chapter focuses on the three riots in terms of the
physical description of the prison, social organization, why and how the riots occurred,
and the aftermath.
Attica
The research on prisons shows that Attica housed more than 2,200 inmates on
September 9, 1971. The emphasis at the institution was confinement and security.
Despite brave talk about rehabilitation as a prime objective of detention, the shortage of
trained personnel and inadequacy of facilities made rehabilitation an impossible dream
(Useem and Kimball, 1987).
Physical Description of the Attica Prison
In 1931, the most secure escape-proof prison ever built was opened in the little
upstate village of Attica, New York (Official Report, 1972). The prison's physical plant
was built to house 1,700 inmates (Reid, 1987). In September 1971, there were 2,243
inmates at Attica (Official Report, 1972). The prison is described as dismal gray in color.
The prison walls are 30 feet in height and the brick is two feet thick in inches. The walls
are in the ground 12 feet deep. The prison also has gun towers on the top. Its diameter
area consist of 53 acres holding 18 buildings. Five of the 18 buildings house inmates.
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The other buildings consist of various services for the prison. A selected gun tower near
the west wall provides an entrance for new inmates and visitors that enter through a black
metal door. All gates at Attica remain locked and are guarded by a correctional officer. A
small area inside the door contains a sign-in book. The walk-in area has metal detectors
that are sensitive enough to detect tin foil.
The administrative building is divided by a concrete wall across the lawn. The
majority of the prison's administrative offices are located inside the walls of the prison.
The construction of the annex occurred in 1966. It contains the package construction
room, visiting room and interviewing rooms. The administrative building is considered the
main housing block. Block A leads to the other corridors; Blocks B, C and D, which form
a square that encloses an open area. Attica has four exercise yards divided by tunnels
intersecting in the middle. The middle is referred to as Times Square. Each tunnel is
guarded by a correctional officer. The end of each tunnel remains locked with a security
device that permits each block to be sealed from the other blocks.
Blocks house on the average 500 inmates which are divided into 12 groups
referred to as companies. The construction of Block E occurred in 1966, which houses
six additional companies. Block C is located behind Block E which has a special
vocational program conducted by the State ofNew York since 1968. Inmates are housed
on three floors in Blocks A, B, C, and E. Hallways were designed to divide each floor
into two separates cell areas. There are two rows of cells in an area, housing a company
of inmates. The cells are referred to as "galleries" in Blocks A, B, and D, which are
designed back to back and separated by a solid wall (see Figure 2.1).
The cells are secured by individual locks. Additional gates separate the stairway





Figure 2.1 Physical Description of the Attica Prison
Service buildings are located outside the cell blocks which join other gate and corridor
areas to the nearest building. The first building on the left of the prison serves as a
reception area which also houses the disciplinary housing unit. The southeast comer of
the prison has a field referred to as the "Ponderosa". When Attica was constmcted, this
area was to have been the site of a gymnasium, but the gymnaisum was never built. The
gymnasium was not constmcted. The three buildings located behind Block D received
severe damage as the rioting occurred; (1) The state shop... which included the clothing
and shoe issuing area, the tailor and shoe shops on the second floor, and the carpentry
shop on the first floor; (2) the auditorium chapel; and, (3) the school (Official Report,
1972).
Social Organization
The development of "Black and Latino" power in the 1960s, spurred by the Black
Muslim movement, significantly influenced the nature of prison life at Attica (Jacob's,
1977). Black and Latino inmates are much more cohesively organized than white inmates
(Jacob's, 1977). Their groups are sometimes rooted in religious and political affiliations
such as the Black Muslims; in groups created specifically, cohesion is a result of the
inmates having some religious(Black Muslims) and political ties. The religious and
political groups are often groups designed to overcome racial discrimination that may have
occurred.
Disagreeing among inmates against the guards and prison administrators was often
an issue. Many inmates, especially Black and Spanish speaking inmates, felt they received
racial mistreatment from the staff. Racism was demonstrated through various job
assignments, discipline and segregation in the inmate dining area. The same feeling of
inmates in prison is very similar to the mistrust felt by residents of the urban ghetto and
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white middle class America . The inmates at Attica were constantly reminded of the racial
outline of whites being keepers over a large group of Black or Spanish speaking inmates.
The young Black inmates viewed white prison guards as the reason for their punishment in
the prison system.
The guards' views were shaped by the experience of seeing blacks as belligerent
and unrepentant criminals. The racial situations did not provide an opportunity for
communication between the inmates and guards.
The inmate militant group formed at Attica banded together for self protection
with its own leadership group. The leadership group often had differences among
themselves. The inmates developed a system of beliefs which could be characterized as
being authoritative and tough.
TheWhy Issue
The Attica riot took place at the end of the summer months in 1971. It resulted
from tension among inmates and guards and slow results for improving conditions. Attica
began to lose its reputation as a Jim Crow institution, and the prison discipline began to
become more relaxed. The courts responded to the inmates' complaints and had begun to
order limited reform efforts. The new Commissioner, Russell Oswald, also called for new
programs and facilities that would improve the inmates' problems.
The environment of the prison was developing a new breed of inmates. The
inmates were mostly blacks and Spanish speaking ghetto residents who had the same
experiences, and fhistrations. They were conscious of the changes in attitudes in the
black, Puerto Rican conununities, on the campuses, in the churches, and in the anti-war
movement. The increasing militancy of the black liberation movement had touched them.
The names ofMalcolm X, George Jackson, Eldridge Cleaver and Angela Davis began to
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have meaning among the inmates. The inmates were bitter and angry. As a result of their
experiences, the ghetto and prison appeared to be the same. Inmates viewed themselves
as political prisoners and not criminals. Attica was viewed as an authoritarianism prison.
The prison guards at Attica were comfortable with inmates who did not cause
problems and remained in their so-called place. However, guards were not prepared or
trained to handle the new inmates. The guards in the past had not had to challenge the
problems relating to their authority. The new programs being developed for inmates, the
relaxed rules and procedures, and the intervention of the courts, had the guards uneasy.
The guards felt that their authority was being undermined and they were not supported by
their superiors. The guards became increasingly resentful and insecure toward their
superiors. The results showed in daily confrontations between inmates and old-fashioned
guards. The confrontations were accompanied by an increasing societal awareness among
inmates and the growth of organizations within the prison. Groups such as the Muslims,
Black Panthers, and Young Lords gained adherents and held meetings to spread the
consciousness and to make changes. Several quarrels and rivals among these groups and
their leaders did not allow them to come together in unity. Gradually, the group efforts
promoted group discussions in the exercise yard. The summer of 1971 ended Avith an
inmate-taught sociology class that became a forum for ideas about changes. Shortly after,
several organized protests began to occur, with a few ending in success.
The inmates' demands were forwarded to the Commissioner and the Governor in
July of 1971 (see Appendix A for an Inmate Manifesto of Demands). The Commissioner
viewed and acknowledged the inmates' demands and visited the highly tensed prison.
Prior to the commissioner’s visit, tensions among inmates increased. The inmates
protested the killing of an inmate at the San Quentin prison by not eating their meals and
displaying a black arm band. The inmates demonstrated their ability to organize strikes
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throughout the entire prison. The commissioner's visit resulted in several speech sessions
promising changes.
The How Issue
The explosion that occurred on Thursday, September 9, 1971, was the result of
incidents from a previous incident the day before. Inmate horseplay in A yard began a
series of confrontations between the guards and inmates. The guards were defeated but
regained control and removed inmates from their cells after inmates began name-calling
and throwing objects from their cells. The inmates promised to gain revenge in two of the
galleries (see Appendix B for a Chronology ofEvents).
The following morning of September 9, 1971, tension continued especially in A
block. This block was considered "difficult" by the administration. Inmates who had
received punishment the previous day were released by their fellow inmates. Following
breakfast, a prison lieutenant was involved in an incident in a tunnel area. The guard
attempted to get the inmates back to their cells, but he was attacked instead. After an
initial outburst of chaotic violence, rebellious inmates from A block gained control of the
locked gate at Times Square. This block separated A block from the other areas of the
prison. The rioting continued as a defective weld broke and allowed inmates access to the
square in the center and keys to three separate gates. The inmates dispersed themselves
among the prison, attacking guards, taking hostages, and destroying prison property. The
rioting spread throughout the prison, and some inmates joined in the rioting. Other
inmates wanted to be freed from their secured areas.
The authorities responded slowly because of the absence of a riot control plan.
The need for more manpower and an out-of-order communication system paralyzed the
administrators. The other area of the prison communication system, a single line phone
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system, prevented the call for help. The request from administrators occurred very late in
the riot. During that morning, at approximately 10:30 a.m., inmates had gained control of
four cellblocks, the yards and tunnels. One 1,281 inmates gathered in D yard and held 40
hostages. This incident played up inmates with power and those versed in the law. Most
of those who took an active role in organizing the yard, drafting demands, and later,
negotiating with the State, had not been involved in the initial outbreak of violence and did
not join in when the rioters reached their area of the prison (Official Report, 1972).
On Friday September 10, 1971, by 11:00 a.m., 1,300 inmates were in D yard,
keeping themselves busy with chaotic milling, looting, disturbing and consuming the
looting materials. Forty-five guards and civilians were held as hostages and confined to
one comer of the yard. The guards and civilians were supervised and protected by the
Muslims. The two hours following, inmates in D yard formed an inmate counter society,
with a degree of formal organization, articulation of political principles, democratic
participation, and law enforcement. The 1:00 p.m. hour continued with volunteers serving
as guards functioning as a defense force, an internal police force, work gangs, and first aid
administrators. The inmates continued to function as guards and guarded the hostages. A
racial balance was maintained in ranks among the black, white and Latin inmates.
By 7:00 p.m., there was reportedly a "functioning, stable society" in D yard, with
"a business section, a residential section, a jail, a police station, a food distribution center,
and a hospital" (Fitch and Tepper, 1971). A postal system was set up by inmates in an
attempt to get out mail to inmates' families. By 11:30 p.m., inmates had collected tables
and typewriters. The inmates recmited four typists, and prepared their demands (see
Appendix B).
By 5:00 a.m., Saturday September 11, 1971, seven inmates were elected to
represent all inmates during the riot. They consisted of black and white inmates in an
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attempt to allow the representatives to show equal selection. Shortly thereafter, three of
the thirty-three observers who were selected by inmates and the State, visited with the
Wyoming County District Attorney, Louis James, and obtained a statement from him.
This statement was in reference to the District Attorney's willingness to prosecute crimes
committed in the jurisdiction if evidence warranted prosecution. The inmates received the
statement very late.
From 3:00 to 5:00 p.m., the observers met with the commissioner and obtained a
list of concessions known as the 28 points. The commissioner was willing to grant some
of the demands of the inmates. The 9:00 p.m. hour began with the observers returning to
the yard area and delivering the 28 points and the James' letter.
On Sunday morning, September 12, 1971, the commissioner concluded nothing
would be gained through the strategic negotiations. The commissioner lost faith in the
observer’s ability to perform the task he believed they should have undertaken; i.e.,
persuading the inmates to accepting a compromise and surrender. The 2:10 p.m. hour
began with the commissioner issuing an ultimatum to inmates requesting the release of
hostages and accepted recommendations from the committee of observers. The
commissioner was not successful with the response and issued a second ultimatum at 7:40
a.m. the following day. Inmates decided to reject this ultimatum as well. The 9.00 a.m.
hour began with inmates transporting hostages with knives to their throats to the A and B
catwalk areas. At 9:46 a m., gas was released into the D yard by helicopter, by Highway
State Patrol officers, and county sheriffs. SWAT team members and rifle squads opened
fire on the inmates in the catwalk areas. The view of the commissioner was somewhat
displeasing. He viewed this incident as a race between the inmates knives and officers
trigger fingers. At 9:50 a.m., the State Highway Patrol helicopter broadcasted a surrender
announcement to the inmates. Shortly after, the firing ceased, resulting in the lost of ten
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hostages and twenty-nine inmates. The Attica riot ended after 10:00 a.m. on Monday,
September 13, 1971.
The Aftermath
The aftermath of the Attica riot began with a disastrous feeling when the prison
officials began to learn the truth before informing the public on the morning occurrences.
They attempted to dispute the truth with rumors. The lead article in the New York's
Times, on Tuesday, September 14, 1971 began as follows:
In the worst of recent American prison riots, several of the hostages-prison guards
and civilian workers-died when convicts slashed their throats with knives. Others
were stabbed and beaten with clubs and lengths of pipes. Walter Dunbar said that
two of the hostages had been killed before today and that one had been stabbed
and emasculated. Of the remaining seven, five were killed instantaneously by the
inmates, and two died in the prison hospital. The deaths of the hostages reflect a
barbarism wholly alien to our civilized society. Prisoners slashed the throats of
utterly helpless, unarmed guards who they had held captive through around-the-
clock negotiations, in which the inmates held out from an increasingly
revolutionary set of demands (Ferretti, 1971).
Twenty-four hours later, news media reported a different story, which concluded
that all nine dead hostages were killed together on Monday. The hostages died of gun¬
shot wounds, and no hostage had been castrated or sexually molested. Much of the
misinformation was channeled from five different correctional officials at Attica to the
Assistant Deputy Commissioner, Wm. Van Eckersen in Albany, and then to the press. It
was established that all nine hostages died from the gun fire from peace officers during the
assault; news media pressed defensive officials for explanation. The correctional officers
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that believed the media sided with the inmates attempted to remind the public of the
inmates’ criminal history. The public information officer of the Department of
Correctional Services provided an announcement on Tuesday afternoon. Five National
Guard Teams had been dispatched to Attica with mine detectors to search for weapons
which might have been buried in D yard by the inmates. The Governor's secretary was
also advised to record the dead inmates' crimes and sentences to alert the public of the
type of inmates that were a part of the riot.
The 3:00 p.m. hour on Tuesday, September 14, 1971, began with the first 16 dead
inmates being identified, and their names were released to the press. By Thursday,
September 16, 1971, all 30 dead inmates had been identified. Prison officials had to pull
the dead inmates' prison records to compare photographs and fingerprints for
identification purposes. The hostages were not difficult to identify.
On Wednesday, September 15, 1971, Justice Goldman, the presiding justice of the
Appellate Division's Fourth Department, named a panel of five men at the request of
Governor Rockefeller for the purpose of monitoring the prison. The five men were,
Donald H. Goff, General Secretary of the Correctional Association of New York;
Clarence B. Jones, the former member of the observers' committee and the former Editor-
Publisher of the Amsterdam News: Austin McCormick, the Executive Director of the
Osborne Association; Louis Nunez, National Executive ofAspira of America; and Robert
P. Patterson, Jr., a member of a New York city law firm. This panel was charged with
safeguarding the inmates' constitutional rights and held its first meeting at the prison on
Friday. After talking to several of the State policemen and conducting interrogations, the
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Goldman Panel felt that adequate warnings were not given to all inmates. The panel
learned from Deputy Attorney General Fisher, that his oral instructions were not followed.
The panel further observed that the State's investigators were solely concerned about
possible crimes committed by the inmates. The State's investigators did not try to
determine the truth of the charges filed by inmates against law enforcement officers in
reference to iiunates' reprisal. These findings led the panel to approach the Governor to
have an investigation of the inmates' charges ordered by the United States Attorney
General. The Goldman Panel prompted the following action:
Transfers to alleviate overcrowding. Panel members were informed by prison
officials at a meeting that several weeks would be required in order to reduce
each cell's occupancy to one inmate. In A block, three men generally occupied
one cell; two inmates slept head to foot on a narrow bed, and the third slept on
the floor with a blanket and no mattress. The plan for reducing the
overcrowding in A block, in the words of the panel, "did not seem defensible,"
and correction officials finally agreed they could achieve one-to-a-cell housing
by September 22, 1971.
Personal property. The panel was instrumental in halting the wholesale
destruction of inmates' property.
Parole. The panel found that "some prisoners scheduled for parole were
apparently being subjected to administrative charges of an insubstantial nature
to prevent improperly their parole." Where it learned of several such cases from
inmates, the panel was able to secure an investigation by the Parole Board
which ordered the inmates' release (Official Report, 1971).
The Goldman Panel continued to work and issued a report with the following
remarks:
Although the scars of Attica are still self-evident and although the ill-feelings
between inmates and correctional officers still smolder, the resumption of normal
routine for over 80 percent of the present population marks an end to the
traditional period contemplated when the panel was appointed. The danger of
harassment of inmates continues, however, in parole and other areas (Official
Report, 1972).
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Prison officials capped the prison population at Attica after the riot. The
overcrowding at another correctional facility in New York required a federal court to
release the cap at Attica and ordered that more inmates be incarcerated there. In the
following year, the special committee on Attica and the Correctional Association ofNew
York issued a document. The document was entitled Attica 1982: An Analysis ofCurrent
Conditions in New York State Prisons, testifying primarily that there has been little
improvements int he basic quality of life for prisoners and personnel, and little reduction in
the underlying tensions and frustrations that led to the uprising.
In September of 1983, approximately 2,000 inmates participated in a sit-in strike at
Attica. The strike involved inmates' refusal to report to their work stations or education
programs. The superintendent met with representatives of several prison organizations to
gather information about complaints and commitment to strike. This strike lasted for a
few weeks, and the normal prison life resumed in early October of 1983. A group of
observers monitored the conditions during the prison strike.
The observers report, Attica 1983: A Report on the Inmate Strike and the
Operations of the Attica Correctional Facility, found that many of the inmates' grievances
were justified on the basis of the serious problems that existed in the prison.
Commissioner Coughlin's complaint of prison overcrowding was a direct result of the
1981 federal court order that required the institution to accept more inmates. The inmates
requested copies of the study, but their request was denied. The inmates filed a law suit to
obtain copies of the study. The federal court held that, the correctional officials did not
show sufficient reasons for withholding the report. The report became available to the
inmates. The 1983 report challenged the conclusion of correctional officials that the
problem at Attica was the result of overcrowding, and new prisons should be provided.
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The report outlined two problems at Attica; poor attitudes exhibited by correctional
officials and insufficient resources. Other problems occurred at Attica such a racist
practices by guards, improper treatment of inmates in solitary confinement, inadequate
medical care, and problems with visitation. The footnote following the report provided
the following comment:
Inmates we have interviewed since the general strike ended have informed us
that Superintendent Smith's chief response to the strike thus far, announced by
him through the public address system in early November, has been to change the
flavor of ice cream available for sale in the commissary (Reid, 1993).
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Santa Fe
The research on the Santa Fe Riot explains that it occurred on February 2-3, 1980
at the Penitentiary ofNew Mexico, outside the capital of Santa Fe. The riot was as deadly
and bloody as the riot at Attica. Like Attica, the Santa Fe riot was widely reported and
was the subject of an extensive state investigation.
Physical Description of the Santa Fe Prison
In New Mexico, the majority of the State’s inmates were housed in the Santa Fe
prison. This was a great difference from the state ofNew York that had several facilities
to house inmates. The Santa Fe prison was established in the downtown area and
experienced a major riot in December of 1952. The inmates held eight hostages for 22
hours and demanded the abolishment of the prisons underground dungeon as punishment.
Six months later, 21 hostages were held for seven hours, with inmate demands of the firing
six guards, better food, no reprisals and interviews with the press, prison board, and the
governor.
The state responded by razing the old penitentiary and constructing a new prison a
dozen miles south of the city. The new prison had a telephone pole design; an extended
corridor connecting the dorms, a hospital, psychiatric buildings, administrative
segregation, and six protective custody units. The two wings were separated by the
administrative area, which included a gynmasium. Catholic and Protestant chapels, an
inmate store, inmate and staff dining halls, a visiting area, and the control center. The
control center had unique equipment that was designed to properly control the prison.
The control center also had unbreakable and shatterproof glass for protection (see Figure




Figure 2.2 Physical Description of the Santa Fe Prison
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corridor, designed to reduce staff needs and control disturbances.
Social Organization
The Santa Fe prison housed 564 of the State's 682 inmates in 1972. Eighty-seven
additional inmates were housed at Las Lunus, a satellite of the Santa Fe prison. The
decline in the Santa Fe prison was a result of an updated probation and parole system.
Several areas of the Santa Fe prison were renovated and transformed into educational,
recreational, and therapeutic wings, thus reducing the residential space. Prison policy¬
makers expected commitments to remain low and the facility to remain adequate and with
a low population. However, the male inmate population increased to 1,569 by 1978. The
increase in the inmate population was the reason new facilities opened.
The inmates at Santa Fe were not considered typical big city residents. At least 36
percent of the inmates were convicted in Bemalilli County, located in Albuquerque, with a
population around 50,000. There were no ethnically based formal organizations existing
at the time. The prison population consisted of 53 percent Hispanic, 37 percent white,
non-Hispanic, nine percent black, and one percent were Native Americans. The cultural
and linguistic bonds caused Hispanic inmates to associate more with one another, even
though the mutual identification among Hispanics was low. There was very little open
expression of national unity, though several Hispanic inmates had photographs ofEmiliano
Zapata on their walls (Useem and Kimball, 1987).
Within the prison, Latin consciousness did not develop in response to a hostile
guard force, since the majority of the guards and commanders were also Hispanic. On
occasions, the Hispanic inmates received more abuse than other inmates. Anglo inmates
believed the Hispanic inmates had a vast majority of the power in the prison, while Blacks
vowed to protect one another. Most inmates strongly rejected the prison administration.
25
Before the riot, there was no indication of gangs in the prisons, and many inmates did not
find themselves politically tied.
During the years 1975 and 1976, the prison control structure changed the chances
of legitimate and illegitimate opportunity for non-violent inmate power. A self-reinforcing
structure of violent competition emerged, which further agitated inmate violence in the
prison. Growing violence and disorder were understood as responses to a new set of
structural imperatives.
The changes in the Santa Fe Prison organizational structure caused inmates to
develop small unstable groups.
TheWhy Issue
The Santa Fe Prison design did not appear to be sufficient enough to accommodate
the inmates. The maximum security prison was designed to house approximately 800
inmates. At the time of the riot, the inmate population was 1,100. Guards were under
paid and poorly trained to perform their jobs effectively.
Many problems existed in the Santa Fe Prison, mainly in the treatment of
psychiatric problems among inmates. The prison Psychiatrist treated inmates inhumanely
by placing them in body casts, leaving small openings for feeding and urination. This was
a form of prison discipline at Santa Fe. However, the guards had another form of
punishment, that was used against the inmates. The guards would kick prisoners in the ass
and knee them in the groin while they were in the basement. Then, the Prisoners were
forced to crawl through a group ofmen armed with baseball bats in a basement area while
handcuffed. The guards method ofpunishment was viewed as brutal, inhumane, unethical,
cruel, and inconsiderate. On top of this, the prison administration regularly and arbitrarily
dished out heavy doses of punishment and encouraged a vengeful informant system that
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pitted prisoners against each other (Gray, 1994). Because of corruption, brutality and
arbitrary discipline in the prison, a riot occurred.
It was hard to monitor or control the misbehavior of the staff under the existing
conditions at the time: overcrowding, understaffing, low morale among the staff at all
levels, management problems (indecisiveness and bureaucratcy), fast turnover of wardens
(five wardens in five years) and confusing policies (Dinitz, 1981).
The How Issue
Inmates gathered on Friday, February 1, 1980 in the evening to plan the riot, after
making homemade beer (hootch). The making of homemade beer showed the ineffective
security in the prison dormitory area. The inmates consumed much of the homemade beer
and began a party. Following the party, they decided on the spur of the moment to take
over the prison that night (Useem and Kimball, 1987).
As outlined in (Appendix C), the 1:30 a.m. hour on Saturday, February 2, 1980
began with three prison guards inspecting the E-2 area. Fifteen fully clothed inmates
sprang from their beds and grabbed the prison guards. Two other inmates forced the
dormitory door opened and overpowered the guard with the keys. The four guards were
stripped, bound, blindfolded, and beaten. The guards also experienced terrorism forcing
them to cooperate with the inmates unlocking several wings and cells. The process of
territorial expansion continued without any serious opposition for five and a quarter hours,
until the entire prison was in the inmates' hands (Useem and Kimball, 1987).
Within the first few minutes of the beginning of the riot, inmates reached the
corridor outside the control center, dragging with them a partially dressed guard. The
hostage was threatened to be killed unless the control center guards opened the gate to the
adjoining administrative area. The demand was refused and the hostage was beaten
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unconscious with a pipe. Inmates gained access to the control area, confiscating tear gas,
grenades and helmets, and keys. The excitment of the inmates caused them to jumble keys
together. Thus, in a span of 15 minutes after the initiation of the riot, the inmates were in
a position to takeover the entire institution (Useem and Kimball, 1987).
The 3:00 a.m. hour began with inmates ransacking the plumbing area and
confiscating an acetylene torch. The inmates began to cut their way through various parts
of the prison. The far south grill was penetrated, allowing inmates to hold another guard
hostage. Inmates found additional torches left by construction workers, giving them more
weaponry to overcome the prison. By 7:00 a.m., the inmates gained entrance to cellblock
4.
The riot continued to progress, and inmates of the E-2 area discovered their lack
of skills to successfully maintain the take over of the prison. The inmates outlined several
reasons: (1) they lacked organizational skills necessary to hold a diverse body of one
thousand men together, or even to see the value of such action; (2) most of them were
drunk or heavily drugged throughout the riot; (3) they could not portray their leadership
role to other inmates; they could only give instructions to people whom they knew
personally and to those in their immediate presence; (4) the telephone pole layout of the
prison, the difficulty in traveling (through holes cut in the grills), and the smoke in the
corridors from the eventual fires made communication with other inmates difficult; and,
(5) although the E-2 inmates were considered to be tough, they could not have controlled
the cellblock 3 inmates, who were even more feared; in fact, some of the cellblock 3
inmates wanted to kill and mutilate "snitches" whom they believed had injured them rather
than killing the hostages (Useem and Kimball, 1987).
The first day of the riot on Saturday, February 2, 1980 at 5:30 a m., a guard
escaped the riot. The guard was escorted by sympathetic inmates who wanted to
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exchange the guard for Deputy Warden Montoya. The 9:00 a m. hour began with
meetings between inmates and administration representatives. The number of inmates
involved in the negotiations was reduced. Many of the Black inmates began to leave the
prison as a large group in unity. Shortly after, twelve inmates were killed by other
inmates. Other inmates were released from their cells, and 350 inmates escaped. Several
hostages were released throughout the day.
By the next morning Sunday, February 3, 1980, inmates with more control
overpowered other inmates. Other inmates continued to escape with very few remaining
in the prison when officials regained control. By twelve noon, several confrontations
between Blacks and Chicanos began to conclude. The Chicanos eventually overpowered
the Black inmates, chasing them in the yard area. The National Guard commander issued
a verbal order to the Chicano inmates.
In summary, inmates made an attempt to organize the riot in a collective protest to
show unity among the inmates. A list of demands were presented to the prison
administration. The hostages were moved to one location in the prison. Other hostages
were severely beaten. Radio contact was maintained with the inmates, in an attempt to
end the riot. Inmate negotiations continued with the exchange of a hostage for a
television cameraman. This group never really controlled the hostages, however, the radio
conununication with the prison administration was constantly interrupted by inmates who
used walkie talkies to contradict the negotiating inmates (Serrill and Katel, 1980).
The Aftermath
The end of one of the worst riots left the prison in disarray. The prison became a
temporary war ground before prison officials regained control. Inmates remained
rebellious, hostile, loud, and rowdy toward the guards. Violence still continued, injuring a
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National Guard Trooper. The inmates resented the presence of the National Guard. The
State Police and National Guards overpowered the inmates and gained control. The riot
left the prison unlivable and inmates were transported to other prisons in the state.
The transportation of inmates to other prisons did not solve the housing problem at
Santa Fe. Approximately 400 to 500 inmates needed housing. The inmates were guarded
on the prison ground and monitored by the National Guard and the SWAT Team.
The riot left inmates without food, water and toilet facilities. Most of the food
was provided by the National Guard. Inmates had previously complained about the food
and continued to be dissatisfied with the current meal arrangement. Toilet facilities also
remained a problem after the riot. Some of the inmates protested and defecated on the
ground which made it unbearable in some camped grounds (Saenz, 1986).
One week after the riot, inmates were returned to the Santa Fe Prison. The Prison
was not livable and inmates continued to destroy the prison with flooding and fires.
Prison guards were reluctant and uneasy about working. The possibility of a new riot
occurring emotionally scared many of the guards. The morale of the prison guards was at
an all-time low. The guards received moral support fi-om upper management.
The prison grounds were guarded by the SWAT Team for the following three
months after the riot. The National Guard also remained on duty mostly outside of the
prison. Additional manpower was provided by the volunteers from the New Mexico
Mounted Patrol, who escorted inmates to medical facilities in Santa Fe and to interviews
conducted by the District Attorney for investigation pertaining to criminal activities during
the riot (Saenz, 1986). Many of the prison guards who were held as hostages were on
sick leave after being traumatized. Because of the physical and mental abuse the guards
sustained during the riot, many of them had nightmares and suicidal tendencies.
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As a result of the riot, the living conditions improved, over-crowding was reduced,
programs increased, and guard brutality ceased. Many of the participants in the riot had
no motive five years later to riot again. Saenz writes about an inmate’s comment on the
riot;
Myself, I wouldn't feel near as good about participating in another one because
there have been some things that have gotten better. They've gotten off my case
and they've gotten off a lot of people's cases, for the most part...It's never going
to be enjoyable but it's livable. Now that (harassment) is not happening, well you
feel a little better about yourself You do it the best way you can and, hopefully,
get out in one piece. And I think you stand a better chance of that now than you
did before (Saenz, 1986).
Inmates believed that outside groups began to have an interest in the prison. The
inmates like the idea of external support and commented about the interest:
It's a shame that we had to fight to get (the improvements), but that's basically
what it was about... to get rid of the man's snitch system. I mean these people that
ran the joint did exactly what they wanted and if you did not like it they would
beat your f~kin' ass and put you in a hole. All that's changed now (Saenz, 1986).
Inmates that were housed in Santa Fe serving long sentences viewed the prison
differently. An inmate, Bobby Ortiz, was one of the inmates that had a different view.
Another inmate, Jonne King, viewed the old Santa Fe as refurbished.
The warden of Santa Fe did not see any rioting in the future. Warden John
Thomas eliminated programs such as Concerned Offenders for Youth Awareness,
Prisoners for Abused Children, fathers in Prison, and the Captured Pawns Chess Club.
The warden received a lot of criticism for eliminating these programs. However, the
prison maintained problems that were present before the rioting. A lot of the jobs, where
inmates were not really doing anything were common at Santa Fe. Some inmates would
lean on brooms for hours, just because they had to be at their assigned job area.
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The state has attempted to stay ahead of the rapid inmate population growth by
continuing prison construction. In 1980, 1,477 inmates were housed at Santa Fe and
other minimum security prisons. By 1990, 3,000 inmates were housed at the Santa Fe
complex and eight prisons in the state. By 1993, the state predicts and inmate population
of 4000. The growth in the prison population threatens incentive controls, stability and
state revenue base, which has been used for new construction of prisons.
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Atlanta
The research on prisons describes the Atlanta Federal Penitentiary as a ninety-one
year old building that came short of closing in 1980. In 1987, many of the eighteen
hundred detainees were a part of the Fidel Castro regime, a problem inherited by President
Jimmy Carter.
Physical Description of the Atlanta Prison
The United States Penitentiary was built in 1902 in the southeast area of Atlanta.
The description of the maximum security prison is massive with high brick walls, guard
towers, and twenty-two buildings on the grounds (see Figure 2.3). The adjacent grounds
house the Southeast Regional Office of the Bureau of Prisons, staff residents, the
powerhouse, and the warehouses. The outer areas are surrounded by residential homes
and a General Motors Assembly Plant. The prison was considered obsolete and the cost
of renovation was more than prison officials could foresee. This inmate population
declined during the 1970s, which at that time predicted a closing in the fixture.
Deactivation plans were initiated, staff members were reassigned, and inmates were
transferred to other prisons. In 1981, the process was halted because of the housing of
long term repeat federal offenders and Cuban detainees. The detainees were held for the
Immigration and Naturalization Services. The inmate population began to take on a new
characteristic. The prison population increased both in Cuban and non-Cuban population.
The prison was gradually reactivated and its closure was no longer necessary.
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Figure 2.3 Physical Description of the Atlanta Federal Penitentiar\'
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I,Dinui
The prison served as a primary detention facility for the high security detainees
until all inmates were removed. This happened subsequent to the riot, which began on
November 23, 1987 and ended on December 4, 1987.
Social Organization
In March of 1981, the Federal Bureau ofPrisons consolidated the Cuban detainees
with custody problems. At the time, the Atlanta prison inmates numbered 1,373, with the
majority of them being Black, homeless and over the age of 10. With the exception of 10
inmates, who were apparently college educated, Cuban detainees claimed to be political
prisoners and anti-Castro. The Cuban detainees had served time in Cuban prisons, and
were serving time in Atlanta's prison for felony convictions in the United States.
The Cuban detainees were initially incarcerated in the United States as illegal
criminal aliens. Many of the Cubans were released on parole as detainee aliens and
rearrested by the Immigration and Naturalization Services, after serving their sentences in
the United States. The detainees were re-paroled or deported back to Cuba even though
they had started families in the United States.
During the riot, a social structure was established among the detainees that
emerged quickly. The possession of handcuffs was noted as a status symbol among the
detainees. The detainees established levels of acceptable and non-acceptable behavior.
Non-acceptable behavior included harming the hostages, stealing, fighting, attempting to
escape, and crowding ahead of detainees in the commissary and food service line. The
expectations of acceptable levels of behavior were based on the detainees belief that
everyone, including the hostages should be treated with respect. Although the detainees
were told by various group leaders that they were classified as free men, they continued to
subject themselves to established prison regulations and expectations for behavior. A
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form of discipline was maintained by group leaders by segregating detainees who
demonstrated out-of-control behavior. The group leaders formed a disciplinary committee
which decided the punishment that was to be imposed. This discipline system was
extended to the hostages as well.
One hostage, for example, was placed in a disciplinary segregation status for a
twenty-four hour period for having a handcuff key. The hostage was separated from the
other hostages and was not allowed to smoke or speak without obtaining permission. The
commissary continued to operate with detainees rationing out food items to one another.
TheWhy Issue
The reasons for the 1987 Atlanta riot were not similar to those responsible for the
Attica and Santa Fe Riots. The Atlanta Riot was the result of events that to the Bureau of
Prisons could not control.
The United States Department of Justice, in collaboration with the State
Department, implemented several programs designed to release the detainees from federal
custody. During 1981-1984, under the Attorney General's Review Plan, over 2000
detainees were paroled. In 1984, the State Department reached an agreement with the
government of Cuba to return up to 2700 detainees, and 201 of them were deported back
to Cuba the following year. However, the Cuban government suspended the agreement in
1985. In 1987, the Immigration and Naturalization Service established a new Cuban
Review Plan, which resulted in the approval of the release ofmore than 500 detainees by
November.
On November 20, 1987, the State Department announced that Cuba had agreed to
reinstate the earlier repatriation accord, which precipitated the disturbances.
36
The State Department informed the Department ofJustice of the resumption of the
treaty on Friday, November 20, 1987 shortly before the Bureau of Prison was informed.
The Warden was also eventually notified. Afterwards, the first news report of the
agreement was broadcasted to the public. The Warden did not have much time to warn
the detainees of the announcement or the fear it might have produced. The warden
prepared himself and the staff for any uneasiness that might occur. The atmosphere
appeared to be calm, but detainees were preparing to take hostages. They reported this
intelligence to their supervisors, but much of it was never transmitted to the warden.
Many of the 290 Cubans planned to riot if they had to face deportation. The decision to
take over the prison was in the making by late Friday evening and the riot began the
following Monday.
Many of the prison staff did not fear the prison to be in jeopardy. This was,
perhaps, because prison officials had become used to threats often verbally expressed by
inmates and detainees. But on November 23, 1987, the detainees in the Atlanta prison
gained control of the prison and held 102 hostages.
In sum, the detainee uprising was caused by their fear of possible repatriation to
Cuba and was evidenced by their demands and promises in (Appendix E). While the cause
of the disturbances was external to the institution, several internal factors may have
prevented the riot. A lack of communication among the staff and the underestimation of
the detainees caused the staff to be unprepared.
The How Issue
The United States and Cuba reinstated the original 1984 agreement providing for
the deportation of 2,500 detainees to Cuba via United states radio and television
broadcasts. The detainees became nervous and fearful of deportation. Many of the
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detainees preferred death over deportation. They gathered luxury items such as junk food,
clothing and letters.
On Saturday, November 21, 1987, the detainees gathered in small groups and
engaged in small talk. The detainees did not go to the recreation area, and most kept to
themselves or other detainees. Prison officials received information from informants
(snitches) that a riot was about to began. On Sunday, November 22, 1987, the detainees,
apart from the other prison inmates, remained in their cells (see Appendix D for a
Chronology ofEvents).
On Monday, November 23, 1987, none of the Cuban detainees attended breakfast
or went to exchange clothing. At 7:30 a.m., all detainees walked briskly and quietly to
work in the non permitted tennis shoes. At 10.25 a m., the riot began when the detainees
gained control of the prison industry building where they worked. They overpowered the
guards and prison industry's personnel, took hostages, and confronted and repulsed
would-be guard reinforcements with homemade knives, spears, bows, and arrows, and
machetes which had been fashioned and hidden three months previously (Roebuck, et al.,
1993).
The broom factory and four of the prison buildings were set on fire. Six people
were dead, fourteen injured, seventy-eight were held as hostages, and fifteen were
unfound. A prison staffmember commented about the riot;
We all knew they were going to riot after the deportation agreement announcement.
All signs pointed to a blow-up. The Cubans should have been locked down after
Oakdale (which happened simultaneously with Atlanta riot), probably before. They
never should have been allowed to go to work on Monday. The administration
gave us the job of convincing them that only a few would go back to Cuba. Hell,
they knew as custody problems they would be the first to go back. Only 45 officers
were on duty when it blew. We faced all those Cubans without any protective riot
gear (gas masks, helmets, riot batons, tear gas, or flack jackets). There was no
effective agreement to deport them three days before the formal announcement.
We didn't. We had no radios for communication with the control room, no keys to
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the UNICOR building or some other prison areas. Some of us did not have body
alarm devices and there was no back-up or supporting tactical riot squared. We
were spread thin over this big sprawling institution at the mercy of all those danrn
Cubans. They knew could take over with little trouble. And they knew if they took
hostages and raised enough hell to the public, they wouldn't be deported (Roebuck,
et. al., 1993).
On Tuesday, November 24, 1987, government buses moved Cuban and American
inmates that were not participating in the riot out of the Atlanta Prison. The Georgia
Army National Guard helicopters dropped water to extinguish the smoldering fires. The
Cubans gained control of the hospital and took the staff hostage. An unidentified detainee
was heard over the Bureau of Prisons radio with threats to kill hostages if the authorities
intervened. They also threatened to throw hostages out of the window if helicopters
appeared again. The Department of Justice officials, military from Fort Bragg, North
Carolina, persoimel from the Glynco, Georgia Federal Training Center, and prison staff
from Butner, North Carolina assisted the Atlanta prison staff.
One month following the riot, the detainees were eventually beginning to give up
the prison. The Bureau of Prison and the Federal Bureau of Investigations entered the
compound and searched for inmates. No hidden inmates were discovered, and no dead or
injured inmates were discovered. The Atlanta Riot was finally over.
All Cuban detainees were in the custody of the United States Immigration Service.
Many of the detainees were assured a new parolee review. If denied parole, the detainees
would receive another review by the Department of Justice.
The Aftermath
The Atlanta Prison Riot ended with agreements negotiated by representatives of
the detainees and the Department of Justice. The agreement provided several issues; (1)
a moratorium was on the detainees deportation to Cuban; (2) an accelerated parole board
hearing process will be provided; (3) due process was granted; (4) immunity from
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prosecution as participants in the riot was granted; (5) additional parole houses would be
established; and (6) permanent alien immigration status to parolees would remain a law-
abiding.
The detainees' negotiating team signed the agreement and returned to the
institution. Other detainees surrendered themselves to the prison staff The riot ended on
December 4, 1987. Shortly afterwards, inmates were moved to other prisons.
Following the riot, many prison staffmembers were not satisfied with the decisions
that were made. Some of the hostages appeared to be very offended. The fiiture plans of
the prison operation was a major concern to the staff
Although it has been a few years since the disastrous riots, the Atlanta prison has
experienced some violence in 1995. On December 22, 1994 a prison guard, D'Antonia
Washington, lost his life at the hands of an inmate. The inmate repeatedly beat the guard
in the head with a hammer, which was smuggled in from the prison factory. Other prison
guards were upset and uneasy about the death.
On January 2, 1995, a female guard, Lisa Scott, was beaten unconscious by an
inmate, suffering injuries to the face, eyes, lips, and neck. A few weeks later on January
14, 1995, a fight began between inmates en route to the dining hall. It quickly spread
throughout the cellblock. Inmates attempted to acquire the keys of a prison guard
resulting in more inmates being injured.
The following few days, inmates received their meals in their cells. The American
Federation of Government Employees asked the Warden (Fred Stock) for his resignation.
This incident called for staff members to be concerned with their safety. A newspaper
reporter had the following comment;
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This is a powder keg, and eventually it's going to blow. We keep seeing these
incidents growing and growing, we've got a real problem out there. Tensions are
growing among the inmates and, with the small staffwe have out there,it's just going
to get worse until we have some relief (Blaylock, 1995).
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CHAPTER III
COMPARISON OF THE THREE MAJOR PRISON RIOTS
In this chapter the three major riots, Attica, Santa Fe and Atlanta, are compared
through the dimensions of social organization, causes and styles of the prison riots, type of
violence and intensity and inmate demands and success (see Table 3.1). Such a
comparison enables us to analyze determinants, process, and consequences of prison
violence within a given context. In addition, the comparison initiates proper strategies and
policies to prevent subsequent riots not in both the specified institution, and in similar
institutions as well. As mentioned earlier, the three prisons in the study are 40 to 90 year
old institutions that have experienced unique riot situations in terms of all foregoing study
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1 • wlrite groups
1 • black groups
1 • Chicano groups
Black and Latino power was
dominant.
Black Muslims movement
significance irr/luenced the nature of
prison life at Attica.
Black Muslun groups were created
to specifically combat racial
discriminahon.
No ethically based organizations
existed.
Hispanics made up a large
percentage of the inmate
population and associated with
each other.
There was very little open poliheal
expression of national unity.
The riot was administered by unhappy |
Cuban prisoners. |
Leadership roles were estabbshed |
quickly by the Cuban detainees |
individual leadership was totaled |
j WIIY/CAUSES
1 • overcrowding
1 • racist adnunistration
1 • snitch factor
1 • fear of being deported
By 1971 the facility was
accommodating 2,243 inmates, it
was designed to house only 1700.
Derisive racial remarks, threats on
the he lives of "Black Niggers" and
"White Niggers-lovers," and other
forms of harassment by correchon
officers roaming the galleries of the
Special Housing unit with white
sheets over their heads in the early
morning hours, charting racist
slogans.
By 1980 the prison was housmg
1,100 inmates it was designed to
hold a maximum of 800 inmates.
Santa Fe's "psychiatric treatment
was brutal, inlrumane, unethical,
cruel and inconsiderable.
The facility in 1987 was not
overcrowded.
The Cubans knew they were gomg to a [
riot after the deportation agreement |
armouncement. 1
They became nervous, and anxious. |
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riii: Attica uprising was not n
planned riot.
Yes, they had hostages.
A misunderstanding in the exercise
yard led to on unusually intense
conformation between officers and
inmates.
A sporadic outburst of chaotic
violence erupted the next day and
the riot broke out.
Their was a high level of
organi'/ation among imiiates.
After the take over, a group of
inmate , cstahlishcrl leadership,
enforced discipline over their fellow
inmates, and rreateil a strong, sense
of solidarity.
IheSanl.i l e, riot was not a
planned riot.
Yes, they had hostages.
They decided to take over the
prison while drinking homemade
beer.
They attacked the shift commander,
during a routine inspection.
They riot was not organized, it was
almost a total lack of organization
by inmates.
The inmate to inmate violence was
wh.il pimi liialed the event.
[ ho AlL'^ntai Kiol was iiol a pl.miHMl ruH
Ihey feared being deported hack to
Cuba and would rather die.
They became reluctant to follow
directions and the following dav Ihev
walked briskly and quietly to work in
tennis shoes instead of rcqiiiresl salety
shoes.
They took over by over-powenng the
guards.
Yes, they had hostag.es
They weie very org,.ioi/i'>l
TAIILP.3.1 CONIINUPD
coMrAmsoNor nin TiiRni-NOToiuous mo rs on sm iicriio pimpnsions
rmsoN mor ATIICA SANTA Hi ATLANIA
rmsoNi'.RS
OHMANDS
• nmncsiy for crimiibil nets
during riot
• trnnsporinlion lo a
"nonimpcrialistic" country
• federal government
intervention in managing the
prison
• reconstruction of iJie prison by
prisoners
• negotiations with specified
harassmentfCray, Voclker
1994:40)









• improved recreation &
education
• better medical and dental care
• clianges in parole policies
• payment of 15 cents per hour
for all inmate prison jobs
• name new disciplinary
committee and end overall
hBrassmenl(Gray, Voelker
1994:40; Galan 1988:209, New
Mexican 10-7-71).
• proicclion under the U S.
ConslituHon
• abrogaliotj of the recent agreement
between the Regan Administration
and the Cuban Government lo return
Uie detainees to Cuba
• judicial review of each individual's
case
• immunity from prosecution for the
uprising
• psychological treatment (or mentally
ill detainees
• negotiations with "compcicnl'
government officials lo lake place in
the presence of inicmalional news
media
• half-way house accommodations (or
detainees without family or friends
in the United Stales
• resolution of the detainees' cases
under the terms of Die 1966 Cuban
Reform Act.
• a ’fair and equitable review*iof the
cases of those detainees already
approved for parole near the
begirming of the rioting federal
official in Oakdale said a "significnnl’
number of Die 998 Cuban detainees
at the prison were near lo being
cases j
TAni.n.i.i coNTiNunn
COMI'AKISON or Till; TI IKmi NOTOKIOUS RIOTS ON Slil.liCTniJ DIMliNSlONS
PRISON ATTICA SANTA FE ATLANTA
OATIiS SEITEMBER 9-13,1971 FEBRUARY 2-3,1980 NOVEMBER 20,1987-
DECEMBER 4,1987
TYPE OF VIOLENCE AND INTENSITY
0\SUALTIES 43 dead:
3 prisoners killed by other prisoners
29 prisoners killed by Slate Police
retaking prison
I prison guard killed by prisoners
II prison employee hostages killed by
State
police retaking prison(Gray, Voelkcr
1994:40)
33 dead:




Bureau of Prisons(AJC 12, I987,12A)
DAMAGES $2 Million; mostly fire and smoke
damage to shoe, carpentry and metal
shops, auditorium<hapel, laundry and
commissary (Gray, Voelkcr 1994:40)
$20 Million: including destruction of
kitchen, classrooms, gym, severe
damage to several cellblocks and
destrucHon of prison records(Gray,
Voelkcr 1994:40)
$33.7 Million: cellhouse E which were
utilized as the detainee segregation unit,
were not burned ,were severely
vandalized Windows were broken,
holes knocked in walls, graffiti painted
on walls and furniture and office
equipment destroyed cell locking devices
and security systems (Report to the
Attorney General, 1988:76)
TABLE 3.1 CONTINUED
COMPARISON OF THE THREE NOTORIOUS RIOTS ON SELECTED DIMENSIONS
PRISON RIOT AITICA SANTA FE ATI.ANrA
DATES SEPTEMBER 9-13,1971 FEBRUARY 2-3,1980 NOVEMBER 20, 1987- DECEMBER 4,
1987
SUCCESS Inmoles were successful in achieving
Iheir demands for which they rioted.
More personal items were permitted in
the prison such as: radios, tape -players
and edible meals.
Inmates were successful in achieving
their demands for which they rioted.
Their was no longer any overcrowding
and abuse to Inmates.
inmates were successful in achieving
their demands for which 0icy noted.
The prison administration hod to
improve their organir.ationni .ind
staffing procedures to accommodate
detainees who did not speak English
Dimensions
Social Organization
The Attica prison riot had ethnically-based organizations. The Black Power
movement had a significant influence on prison life. Inmates developed a democratic
political structure, voiced an ideology of inmate brotherhood, and held open meetings
during the riot. Although the ethnic influenced shifted from Blacks to Cubans, the
inmates at the Atlanta Penitentiary demonstrated a considerable cooperation among
themselves. On the contrary, Santa Fe inmates had no formal ethnic organizations
despite the fact that the majority of them were Hispanic. Such a lack of imity among
inmates led to snitching on one another, development of mutual hatred, dysfunctional
orientation, and an inability to fight for the common good. On the other had, the Santa Fe
officials erroneously believed in a "divided and rule" policy. The staff sought safety by
encouraging inmates to snitch on one another and increasing their dependency on drugs.
This practice led prison administrators to believe that they were still safe even when the
inmates celebrated with a prison brewed alcohol just before the a riot began. Social
disorganization often results in a greater loss than success, and, therefore, is a self¬
destructive mechanism both for inmates and staff populations. Staff will have a better
chance of convincing, explaining, negotiating, and compromising in critical situations if
they train inmates to follow the principles of social organization. This can be
accomplished by promoting a sense of belonging among inmates and by involving them
in institution-wide activities (work related and recreational) as a group, instead of as an
isolated individual. In a well organized situation, the inmate and the staff groups can
work not only effectively for their safety, but can do so for the well-being of each other.
48
The way Atlanta inmates won the riot sets a good example for inmate social organization,
but the lack of such organization among staff places them at a higher risk even today.
Causes and Style of the Riots
The problems with overcrowding and understaffing were prevalent in all three
prisons. Poor staff to inmates relations characterized by staff hostility, the inadequate or
absence of staff training to deal with inmates, deplorable living conditions, and
management problems were common bases for riots at Attica and Santa Fe prisons. In
addition to the problems at the prisons, each prison had a unique contributing factor to
riot.
The Attica prison's racial polarity and mistrust were the main sources of mutual
disrespect and impossible commimication between the two groups. The black inmates
viewed white officers as racists and oppressors who put them behind bars; the officers
saw themselves as authority figures and believed that blacks were belligerent unrepentant
criminals. Some of the white staff members roamed in the galleries of the Special
Housing Unit making racial remarks and threats on the lives of "black niggers" and
"white nigger lovers." A special, unique, and accidental cause was the unexpected,
mechanical failure of the snitch factor, as well as, the brutal, unethical, and inhumane
treatment (including psychiatric treatment) of inmates. The conditions, along with a fast
turnover of wardens and confusing policies, increased the disorder and set the stage for
the riot. Unlike Attica and Santa Fe, where the unique contributing factors are internal,
Atlanta experienced unique external factors, such as the fear of repatriation to Cuba
among inmates. This factor was beyond the control of the Bureau of Prisons.
Regarding the style of the riots, both Attica and Atlanta Riots were organized,
while Santa Fe was unorganized. The purpose of the former two riots was to accomplish
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something through collective rebellious behavior. For example, Attica aimed to abandon
racist administration and acquire better living conditions and better treatment, while
Atlanta wanted assurance from the government against repatriation to Cuba. Santa Fe's
purpose was primarily revenge against one another and against staff members. Therefore,
it was not an instrumental riot, but rather an expressive one. There was also a difference
in the type of leadership which arose among the inmates during the riot. The Attica
inmates formed a hierarchy of groups, but major decisions were made by the entire group.
The Atlanta riot did not have a single inmate in charge of the revolt. The rioting inmates
were very organized, and they constantly shared responsibility of speaking for the entire
group of inmates. However, at the Santa Fe riot, there was not one inmate who was
considered an authority figure. This resulted in the inmates forming bonds, and cliques,
and allowing decisions to come about on a personal basis.
Type ofViolence and Intensity
Violence is a major aspect of prison society and is constantly increasing. Though
the elements and characteristics of violence have changed over a period of time, it
remains in prisons. Prison violence, bmtality, and intensity is undoubtedly a sad, but ever
present aspect of institutional life. Violence can be individualistic (inmate v. inmate or
guard V. inmate) in the form ofwide scale prison riots. The Attica riot claimed 39 lives,
Santa Fe 33, and the Atlanta riot claimed six lives. Reports of violent deaths in prisons
are routine occurrences that American citizens are not prepared to accept.
Although there is no single explanation for the violent behavior of either group,
they both have the potential to become very intense and brutal. One position that holds
true, however, is that inmates are often perceived to be violence-prone individuals who
use force to get their way. A second view is that prisons provide a conducive
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environment to violence, through and by existing conditions; including overcrowding,
depersonalization, untrained staff, mutual hatred, lack of rehabilitative alternatives,
recreational facilities, and inmate privacy. Additionally, another view is that prison
violence stems from prison mismanagement, lack of strong security, inadequate control
of prison staff, insensitivity to staff on the part of management, and miscommunication
between inmates, staff and management. An example at the Santa Fe riot was that some
of the hostages were severely injured and subjected to lasting psychological trauma. On
the contrary, during the Atlanta riot, the majority of the damage was done externally to
the facility. No harm was done to the hostages because the inmates felt as though they
were treated well by the prison staff before the disturbances began.
Inmate Demands
Through a slow process of legal review, the courts have granted inmates a number
of substantial rights that have significantly influenced the entire correctional institution.
In general, inmates have been granted the right to practice as their own attorneys in the
courts, to have a limited due process hearing in discipline cases, and to be free of
unreasonable searches and seizures. But in the inmates' day-to-day interaction within the
institution, the inmates have also demanded fair treatment by staff and management,
sufficient amount of nutritious food, and sanitary living conditions. The inmates have
also protested physical abuse by guards.
The Attica inmates open negotiation occurred before the entire group of inmates.
The inmates argued for a set of demands that represented all inmates. Tragically enough,
the negotiation occurred after 39 lives were lost. At the Santa Fe Riot, inmates'
negotiations were mostly for the inmates self interest. The inmates were interested in
destroying the prison and trading the lives of hostages for personal benefits. The Atlanta
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riot Cuban inmates were well organized, and rotated the negotiations at each stage. All
decisions were decided by the group of inmates as a whole.
Sugggss
The inmates incarcerated in the prisons won all three riots. The inmates were
successful in achieving their demands. Today, in 1995, Attica houses approximately
2,116 inmates in single occupancy cells, which is a decrease in the population of 400
inmates since the riot occurred. The prison receives and releases approximately 60
inmates weekly. Inmates can receive two and four year degrees from local colleges. The
availability of showers, toilet paper and other needs for daily living, which were among
the catalysts of the riot, have been addressed. The prison company of 40 inmates have
two shower stalls on the cell block. The inmates are allowed to have at least three
showers weekly.
Personal hygiene items such a soap, razors and toothbrushes are now regularly
provided, and clothing restrictions have been relaxed. Inmates are allowed options within
certain guidelines regarding shirts and shoes. However, the state issued green pants as
mandatory for all inmates. Meals are described by inmates as "edible." Provisions were
made for inmates with religious dietary requirements. Inmates are allowed television
time and possession of radios and tape players. Visitation privileges have been extended
to include family reunion programs. Health care for inmates has improved, adding full¬
time doctors to the prison and a psychiatrist.
The Atlanta prison administration improved the organization and staff procedures.
The improvements included the non English speaking inmates. Other small
improvements are still needed in the areas of security and living conditions.
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The Santa Fe riot is considered the most successful riot of the three compared.
There is neither the overcrowding nor the daily abuse of inmates that was common before
the riots began. Changes include improved visitation rights (i.e. conjugal visits), better
medical care, and highly trained professional guards.
In general, as a consequence of the costly riots, state and federal governments
have given attention to treatment programs (education, vocation and work release).
Prison labor is used to produce soap, clothing, office furniture, license plates, road signs
and other products used by the state. The Federal Prison System have expanded
vocational training and work opportunities for all inmates. Under the direction of the
Federal Prison Industries (FPI), the Federal System operates over 100 work places
producing various items. The items include shoes, boots, paint brushes, textiles,
canvases, mattresses, clothing, parachutes, furniture, cable assemblies, wiring harness,
printed circuits, computer services, drafting, printing services, and signs.
The causes for the riots should prompt the prison officials to give early attention
to inmate complaints. The inmates’ views should be accounted for in major decision




This thesis examined and compared three unique prison riots that occurred over a
span of 16 years. The riots were unique in terms of their social organization, causes and
style, type of violence and intensity, demands, and negotiations. However, the riots
shared a frustration with existing conditions among inmates and the past success of the
past riot. In general, the riots approximate the grievance dramatization theory (Ohlin,
1956). This theory is accepted by the American Correctional Association and it asserts
inmates riot deliberately, in order to draw attention to their plight.
First, the fhistrated inmates reacted to self perceived, long standing, personal,
legal and moral grievances by a mutual agreement process, in order to reaffirm the
inmates common dissatisfaction with existing conditions. Secondly, the inmates
deliberately rioted to correct the grievances; that is, by violent self-presentations that
drew attention to their plight. Third, the inmates negotiated specific objectives within a
riot plan, which required further self-presentations. Finally, the inmates achieved their
objectives, which improved their living conditions and rights.
The riots that occur in prison are classified as a social problem because they affect
society. Persons convicted of a crime rely on management assistance, and when it is not
provided by management, they rebel violently. The correctional staff are not sensitive to
problems that can lead to rioting. Riots also occur when security and surveillance do not
work effectively, which can prevent a riot from spreading to other areas of the prison.
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Recommendations
A. Recommendation to Minimize Prison Violence: This analysis on selected prison riots
indicates that the following measures help to reduce violence in prisons:
1. Living conditions should be improved by providing reasonable visiting hours
limited restraints on mail, availability of pay phones for inmates' use, reduced time
spent in the cells, desirable food choices, recreational facilities, and sanitary
shower and toilet areas.
2. Inmate development activities such as effective educational programs,
vocational training, alcohol and drug treatment programs should be adopted.
Increasing inmate dependency on drugs as a correctional measure proved to be
suicidal in the Santa Fe riot. This mistake should never be repeated.
3. Staff-to-inmate relationships should be strengthened by organizing staff
workshops on positive attitude and job ethics, and conducting inmate workshops
on aggression management and tension resolution. Inmates should be represented
on certain decision-making committees, form citizen prison committees, assist in
reforming the prison organizational structure in removing the rigid hierarchical
structure in the division of labor, and in improving the accountability of the line
personnel.
4. Focus should be placed on researching the empirical prison problems; rather
than on mere theoretical speculation and political rhetoric.
5. Staff, especially females, should not go into high security cellblock areas of
the prison without a backup person. The females should not be allowed to stay on
duty more than eight hours on a given day, or without proper training.
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6. Staff members should be constantly reminded of their professionalism, a need
to avoid racial and demeaning attitudes toward inmates, and effective and secure
ways of handling inmates.
7. Reasonable staff-to-inmate ratios must be maintained, in prisons where high
security inmates are housed.
8. Effective security measures should be developed. An example would be each
cell having a video monitor, cormected to a central control place, providing an
access to detect drugs and alcohol being used, knives made, and any other illegal
activity.
9. The Bureau of Prisons must design separate criteria for high security prisons
in order to upgrade the required resources, especially as they relate to staff and
security.
10. An incentive mechanism should be developed to encourage inmates to display
progress in controlling their aggressive behavior, resolving disputes in a civil
maimer, and gaining occupational skills.
11. Inmates should be taught how to utilize their representations to mediate when
they are angry with other inmates or staff members, without being violent or
encountering violent situations to resolve their disagreements. Inmates should be
seriously discouraged from snitching on one another.
12. Finally, a fair inmate grievance policy should be designed and implemented.
When major decision policies are considered, the inmate voice should be taken into
accoimt, in order to avoid later outbursts.
B. Suggestions for Future Research:Future studies on prison violence should focus on
the historical study of prisons, in order to imderstand the process and dynamics of violent
behavior over a period of time. This behavior eventually takes the form of a riot. This
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study would involve a developmental analysis, in which a series of stages could be
identified between the 'old order' of authoritarian control and 'post riot' reform. Secondly,
an ethnographic study of the inmate population would help greatly in probing the minds
of the inmates and studying the reasons behind their actions. This level of understanding
is especially important when designing and implementing effective rehabilitation
programs. Finally, future studies should examine the short term and long term impact of





Proposals Collected Friday Night
Inmate Manifesto ofDemands
The 28 Points
1. Provide adequate food, water, and shelter for all inmates.
2. Inmates shall be permitted to return to their cells or to other suitable accommodations
or shelter under their own power. The observers committee shall monitor the
implementation of these operation.
3. Grant complete administrative amnesty to all persons associated with this matter. By
administrative amnesty, the state agrees:
a. Not to take any adverse parole actions, administrative proceeding, physical
pimishment, or other type of harassment such as holding irunates incommunicado,
segregating any inmates, or keeping them in isolation or in twenty-four hour lockup.
b. The state will grant legal amnesty in regard to all civil actions which could arise from
this matter.
c. It is agreed that the state ofNew York and all its departments, division, and
subdivisions, including the state Department ofCorrections and the Attica correctional
facility, and its employees and agents shall not file or initiate any criminal complaint
or act on complaints in any criminal action of any kind or nature relating to property,
property damage, or property related crimes arising out of incidents at the Attica
prison during September 9,10,11, 1971.
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d. The District Attorney ofWyoming county, New York has issued and signed letter as
of this date.
4. Establish by October 1,1971, a permanent ombudsman service for this facility staffed
by appropriate persons from the neighboring communities.
5. Recommend the application of the New York state minimum wage law standards to
all work done by inmates. Every effort will be made to make the records ofpayments
available to inmates.
6. Allow all New York State prisoners to be politically active, without intimidation or
reprisal.
7. Allow true religious freedom.
8. End all censorship ofnewspaper, magazines, and other publications from publishers,
unless it is determined by qualified authority which includes the ombudsman that the
literature in question presents a clear and present danger to the safety and security of
the institution. Institution spot censoring only of letters.
9. Allow all inmates at their own expense, to communicate wdth anyone they please.
10. Institute realistic, effective rehabilitation programs for all inmates, according to their
offense and personal needs.
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11. Modernize the inmate education system, including the establishment of a Latin
library.
12. Provide an effective narcotics treatment program for all prisoners requesting such
treatment.
13. Provide or allow adequate legal assistance to all inmates requesting it or permit them
to use inmate legal assistance of their choice in any proceeding whatsoever. In all
such proceeding, inmates shall be entitled to appropriate due process of law.
14. Provide a healthy diet; reduce the number ofpork dishes; increase fresh fruit daily.
15. Reduce sell tie, increase recreation facilities and equipment, hopefully by November
1, 1971.
16. Provide adequate medical treatment for every inmate; engage either a Spanish
speaking doctor or inmates interpreters who will accompany Spanish speaking
inmates to medical interviews.
17. Institute a program for the recruitment and employment of a significant number of
black and Spanish speaking officers.
18. Establish an inmate grievance commission comprised of one elected inmate from
each company which is authorized to speak to the administration concerning
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grievance, and develop other procedures for the inmate participation in the operation
and decision making processes ofthe institution.
19. Investigate the alleged expropriation of inmates funds and the use ofprofits from the
metal and other shops.
20. The state commissioner of correctional services will recommend that he penal law
be changed to cease administrative resentencing of inmates returned for parole
violation.
21. Recommend that Menechino hearings be held promptly and fairly.
22. Recommend necessary legislation and more adequate fimds to expand work release
programs.
23. End appealed list for correspondence and visitors.
24. Remove visitation screens as soon as possible.
25. Paroled inmates shall not be charged with parole violations for moving traffic
violations or driving without a license, uncormected with any other crime.
26. Institute a thirty day maximum for segregation arising our of any offense. Every
effort should be geared toward restoring the individual to regular housing as soon as
possible, consist with safety regulations.
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27. Permit access to outside dentists and doctors at the inmates own expense within the
institution, where possible, and consistent with scheduling problems, medical
diagnosis, and health needs.
28. It is expressly understood that members of the observers committee will be permitted
into the institution on a reasonable basis to determine whether all of the above
provisions are being effectively carried out. I questions ofadequacy are raised, the








3:45 p.m. Inmate horseplay in A yard leads to a confrontation between officers and
inmates. A lieutenant is struck by inmates.
5:30 p.m. Two inmates identified as involved in A yard incident are moved to HBZ
amidst angry reaction of fellow inmates on their galleries. A correction officer is
struck in the head by a full can of soup thrown by an inmate in five eompany.
Thursday, September 9, 1971
8:20 a.m. Inmate who threw the can of soup is released. They join eompany
inmates during the lineup for breakfast. The entire eompany proceeds to breakfast.
8:50 a.m. A lieutenant approaches to talk with five company in A turmel as they
returned from breakfast. He is struck and knocked to the floor by imnates.
9:05 a.m. Times square gate is broken down by inmates. The offieer on duty is
knocked unconscious. Inmates have access to all four main cellblocks.
63
9:15 a.m. Prison alarm is sounded.
10:30 a.m. Twelve himdred eighty-one inmates and forty-three hostages assemble in
D yard. Inmates are in control of all five cellblocks and six other buildings. Mid
correctional personnel reestablish control of areas, and rebelling inmates have
afternoon deserted. Inmates hold B and D blocks, the exercise yards, the tuimels,
and the catwalks.
2:00 p.m. Commissioner Oswald arrives at Attica.
3:00 p.m. Arthur Eve and Herman Schwartz enter D yard to speak with inmates.
4:25 p.m. Commissioner Oswald enters D yard with Eve and Scheartz. He speaks
with inmates for almost an hour and agrees to their demands for food, water, and
presence of citizen observers.
5:45 p.m. Oswald, Eve, and Scheartz return to the yard accompanied by reporters.
Inmates present Oswald with "Practical Proposals." They talk for an hour.
7:30 p.m. Deputy Commissioner Dunbar and others talk with inmates in D yard.
Inmates demand an injunction against reprisals.
11:45 p.m. Members of Governor Rockefeller's staff arrive at Attica. Professor
Schwartz flies to Vermont to obtain federal court injunction protecting inmates from
reprisals and administrative sanctions.
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Friday, September 10,1971
11:25 a.m. Oswald, observers, and the press enter D yard with injunction. Inmates
question its validity and rip it up.
1:00 p.m. Inmates in D yard hold block elections for spokesman to participate in
negotiations.
5:00 p.m. Thirty-three observers have assembled at Attica and are briefed by Oswald
and other officials.
7:00 p.m. Observers pay brief visit to D yard.
11:30 p.m. Observers' committee returns to D yard to learn inmates' demands.
Saturday, September 11,1971
5:00 a.m. Observers return to administration building and elect six member
executive committee.
Morning. Three observers obtain disclaimer of vindictive prosecutions fi'om
Wyoming county district attorney.
Afternoon executive committee observers negotiates with Oswald. Twenty-eight
"Proposals Acceptable to Commissioner Oswald" resulted. News of Officer William
Quinn's death is received.
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8:30 p.m. Bobby Seale enters Attica.
9:00 p.m. Observers enter D yard with twenty-eighty points. Seale makes
noncommittal remarks and leaves. Some observers remain for several hours to
discuss points with inmates.
11:30 p.m. Inmates reject a settlement based on twenty-eight points.
Sunday, September 12,1971
11:00 a.m. Observers' committee issues public appeal to Governor Rockefeller
asking him to meet with them at Attica.
1:20 p.m. Observers Wicker, Jones, Badillo, and Dunne telephone Governor
Rockefeller asking him to meet with them at Attica.
2:10 p.m. Commissioner Oswald issues a statement to inmates, urging acceptance of
twenty-eighty points, requesting release of hostages and proposing negotiations on
neutral ground.
3:00 p.m. Oswald and observers hold final discussion. Oswald telephones
Rockefeller and ask him to come to Attica. Rockefeller reaffirms earlier decision not
to come.
Monday, September 13,1971
7:70 a.m. Commissioner Oswald's ultimatum is read to inmates in D yard.
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9:00 a.m. Eight blindfold hostages are brought up to A and B catwalks. Inmates
"executioners" hold knives at their throats or torso.
9:30 a.m. inmates reject ultimatum.
9:46 a.m. Assault on D yard begins with a gas drop.
9:50 a.m. State Police helicopter broadcasts surrender announcements to inmates.
9:52 a.m. The firings stops. Ten hostages and twenty-nine inmates are dead.
Inmates Demands - Attica
To the people ofAmerica:
The incident that has erupted here at Attica is not a result of the dastardly bushwhacking
of the two prisoners September 8, 1971 but of the unmitigated oppression wrought by the
racist administration network of the prison, throughout the year. We are men! We are
not beats and so not intend to be beaten or driven as such. The entire prison populace has
set forth to change forever the ruthless brutalization and disregard for the lives of the
prisoners here and throughout the United States. What had happened here is but the
sound before the fury of those who are oppressed. We will not compromise on any terms
except to those that are agreeable to us. We call upon all the conscientious citizens of
America to assist us in putting an end to this situation that threatens the lives of not only
us, but each and everyone of us as well. We have set forth demands that will bring closer
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to reality the demise of these prisons that serve no useful purpose to the people of
America, but to those who would enslave and exploit the people ofAmerica.
Our demands are such:
1. We want complete amnesty. Meaning freedom for all and from all physical, menial
and legal reprisals.
2. We want now speedy and safe transportation out of confinement, to a non-
imperialistic country.
3. We demand that federal government intervene, so that we will be under direct federal
jurisdiction.
4. We demand the reconstruction ofAttica Prison to be done by inmates and or inmates
supervision.
5. We urgently demand immediate negotiation through Wm. M. Kimstler, Attorney at
Law, 588 Ninth Ave., New York City, and Assemblyman Arthur O. Eve of Buffalo,
New York. The Solidarity Prison Committee, Minister Farrahkan of M.S. Palante,
the Young Lords Party, the Black Panther Party, and the Black Panther Party Paper
(Clarence Jones of Amster News). Tom Wicker of the New York Times, Richard
Roth from the courier express, the Fortune Society, Dave Anderson of the Urban
League of Rochester, New York, Blond Eva-Bond Nipcap., and Jim Ingram of
Democratic Chronicle of Detroit, Michigan. We guarantee the safe passage of all
people to and from the institution. We invite all people to come here and witness this
degradation, so that they can better know how to bring this degradation to an end.
6. We intensely demand that all communication will be conducted in "Our" Domain
"Guaranteeing safe transportation to and from."






Saturday, February 2, 1980
1:40 a.ni. Several so-called "new breed" inmates in dormitory E-2 over powered four
guards after hasty planning and several drinks of home-made alcohol.
1:30 a.m. The guards were forced to open other doors leading to other cells to imlock.
3:30 a.m. Inmates ransacking the plumbing shop near the cafeteria found an
acetylene torch. Inmates proceed to cut their way into every remaining part of the
penitentiary.
12:00 noon The first day of the riot, the killings in cell block four were complete.
Only twelve residents of the block were actually killed. The rest were released from
their cells.
5:30 a.m. A guard was first hostage to escape the riot. He was escorted by
sympathetic inmates, he slipped past he rioting.
9:00 a.m. Face-to-face meeting between negotiators and administration representatives
began, which involved mostly E-2 inmates.
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12:00 noon, A small, more stable group of inmates became involved in the
negotiations.
5:15 p.m. Three hundred and fifty inmates had fled the riot.
Sunday, February 3,1980
The stable group of inmates had taken control of the inmate representation. The
number of fleeing inmates had risen to eight hundred. There were about one hundred





(November 20 - December 5, 1987)
Friday, November 20,1987
10:30 a.m. After a call from Bureau of Prison's Director Quinlan, Regional Director
McCune called Atlanta Warden Petrovsky to report that the State Department would
be making an announcement at 12:00 noon that the Cuban Government agreed to
reinstitute the 1984 repatriation treaty. Although it was known that more than 2,500
Cuban detainees might be involved, the number of detainees at the USP, Atlanta, who
might be deported or returned to Cuba under the terms of the treaty was not known at
this time.
11:00 a.m. The Atlanta Warden held a meeting with top level institution persormel to
advise them of the armouncement by the State Department that 2,500 or more Cuban
detainees might be returned to Cuba in the very near future. He advised the Associate
Wardens(AW's), the Department Heads and Unit Managers to "Keep their ears to the
ground" in order to try to pick up detainee reactions. The Warden called the Regional
Director of INS in Atlanta and was advised that apparently no more than 94 Cuban
detainees at the Penitentiary would be affected by re-initiating the treaty with Cuba.
INS staff reported that they advised the Warden that approximately 100 of the Atlanta
detainees had been physically in the institution in 1984/85, and might have known
they were subject to the repatriation treaty.
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11:20 a.m. to 1:30 p.m. During the staffmeeting, the Warden was advised that a local
television station had already broadcast a report about reinstitution of the treaty with
Cuba and that more than 2,500 Cubans were going to be departed.
Staff circulated through the institution engaging inmates in conversations, attempting
to assure them that only a small number of them would be affected by the treaty and
that they should "be cool" until more information was available.
3:45 The Warden held a close-out meeting with his AWs, Department Heads and Unit
Managers to discuss conditions
4:00 p.m. to Midnight Evening shift staff monitored the situation and reported meals
and activities were routine or normal. According to the information received by the
Warden, the detainees appeared to be taking the information about the repatriation
reasonably well.
Saturday, November 21,1987
Midnight- 5:00 a.m. The Warden contacted the institution several times and was told
that all was quiet.
5:30 a.m. to 7:15 a.m. The inmates were released for breakfast and the morning meal
was conducted without problems.
7:30 a.m. to 9:00 p.m. Since no work was scheduled on Saturday, a routine weekend
schedule was in effect. Several line staff reported being approached by detainees
with questions about the repatriation treaty and what it meant for them, but overall
operations seemed normal. No extra staff were on duty inside the institution and the
evening meal was conducted without incident.
9:10 p.m. Warden Petrovsky was called by the Southeast Region Duty officer and
advised that a disturbance was under way at the Federal detention Center (FDC),
Oakdale, Louisiana. The Warden met with his staff and learned that the detainees
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were aware of the Oakdale disturbance but were not displaying any indications of
adverse detainee reaction.
10:00 p.m. Southeast Regional Director McCune returned an earlier call from the
Director and discussed the possible impact of the Oakdale disturbance on Atlanta.
Sunday, November 22,1987
4:25 a.m. The Director called the Southeast Regional Director, Gary McCune to
update him on the Oakdale situation, and conferred with him about the situation at the
Atlanta institution. Similar conferences continued throughout the day.
6:00 a.m. The Warden advised his staff to go out and monitor the situation in the
institution by speaking with the detainees and urging them to be calm. No notable
observations were reported during the day.
6:00 p.m. Warden held a meeting with Department Heads, Associate Wardens and
Unit Managers and asked each whether or not the institution should be "locked
down." They unanimously responded, that there was no reason to lock down.
8:00 p.m. The Regional Director again conferred Avith the Director and reported there
were no significant signs of problems.
Monday, November 23,1987
5:30 a.m. The lieutenant of the institution reported he called an Associate Warden to
obtain approval to open cells for breakfast. Several Correctional Officers had
prepared memoranda on confidential report forms, describing information received
during the previous evening and early morning hours which suggested that serious
problems could be expected during the day.
5:45 a.m. Cellblocks and dormitories opened for breakfast. Staff reported very few
detainees left for breakfast when first opened.
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6:00 a.m. The Warden met with his top staff and told them to get out into the
institution and reassure the detainees that further information would be passed out as
soon as it was available.
7:10 a.m. Breakfast concluded and detainees returned to cellblocks to prepare for
work call.
7:25 a.m. Institution work call was sounded with all living units opened for detainees
and inmates to report for work. A substantial number of detainees were permitted by
the staff to leave their imits wearing termis shoes, which might prompt their job
supervisors to send them back to the housing units to change shoes, effectively
removing them from the factory without having to refuse to work overtly. Some staff
even reported later seeing detainees with extra clothing, another unusual occurrence.
7:30 a.m. The Associate Warden (Custody) asked and obtained approval from the
Warden to hod over the morning watch staff for two hours to be available for any
emergency.
8:00 to 9:00 a.m. Monday, The warden continued to receive information from his
Executive Staff regarding detainee activities. Work detail foreman reported that a
large munber of detainees were coming to work in teimis shoes (which normally
would result in their being sent back to their housing units to change into safety
shoes).
9:07 a.m. The Regional Director called to advise the Director about developments and
the situation at Atlanta.
9:10 a.m. After the detainees began reporting for work, the UNICOR Superintendent
received reports from his supervisors in UNICOR that detainees were warning staffof
trouble that morning. One detainee in UNICOR had told his supervisor that "it would
be a good idea not to have the female staffworking in the building today," or words
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to that effect. Another detainee reported that the supervisor "should not be working
today", or words to that effect.
9:15 a.m. The institution's Chief Dental Officer called the Warden and said that an
inmate (Who used to work for him) had told him to "be careful today," or words to
that effect.
9:30 a.m. The Warden received a telephone call from a Correctional Officer working
at the Hospital entrance post, screaming (in and out-of-control manner), and
demanding that the Warden call the Governor and call in the National Guard.
10:05 a.m. The UNICOR Superintendent briefed the Warden on conditions in
UNICOR after a tour through the factory and discussions with the detainees.
Discussions were held by the Warden with the INS Assistant Director for
Deportation; Still no additional information was available which would assist in
explaining the situation to the detainees.
10:07 a.m. Regional Director McCune called and spoke with Director Quinlan about
the Atlanta Penitentiary disturbance squads.
started is unclear. Some observers remember the alarms beginning before 10:00 a.m.
Others have the 10:15 a.m. to 10:30 a.m. Monday, November 23, 1987 The exact
time the disturbance riot beginning as late as 10:45. The best information available
at this time suggests it began between 10:15 a.m. and 10:30 a.m.
Several correctional Officers dispersed on the yard were directed by Lieutenants to
report to each location where the emergency alarm was sounded. As staff were
responding to these alarms, another "222" (emergency alarm telephone or "the
deuces" alarm was sounded from an officer in the Yard next to Industries. Another
alarm was sounded from the dining hall and inmates and detainees surging out of the
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front and side of the front and side of the dining hall. Detainees begin capturing staff
as hostages in UNICOR, on the yard, and in the Dining Room.
The riot had begim.
Hundreds of detainees exited the UNICOR Building, some carrying machetes an
other weapons such as boards, etc., and were seen rounding up staff members on the
compoimd, taking their radios and keys and handcuffing them with their own
handcuffs.
10:30 to 10:40 a.m. A few staffwere captured almost immediately after the riot began
in the Dining Room.
10:45 a.m. The Directors Office telefaxed a copy of the Attorney General's letter
regarding the moratorium on deportation being offered to the detainees to the
Regional Office for the Warden and Regional Director.
10:50 a.m. Also at this time, a large group of detainees entered the sally port dorm the
East Yard and attempted to open the grille leading to the rear of the main corridor.
12:00 Noon until 5:00 p.m. Emergency procedures were put into effect to assess the
situation and to try to locate all staff. Throughout the day, reports were received as to
the location and status of almost all of the missing staff members, except for two
Safety Department staffmembers.
5:30 p.m. The Regional Director of the Bureau of Prisons, the FBI, and the Warden
decided it was safe and practical to attempt a rescue of the 16 Bureau of Prisons staff
trapped in E Cellhouse.
11:50 p.m. Monday, By this time, it was evident that backup staff were needed at the
command level.
Tuesday, November 24, 1987
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Midnight to 7:00 a.m. The Warden and most of his Executive Staff remained at the
institution throughout the night.
1:00 a.m. to 2:00 a.m. The Safety Manager and his assistant were released from their
office in the basement of the UNICOR building with the help of detainees who
worked for them. Both staff escaped trough the East gate.
7:30 a.m. Perimeter security procedures were formalized by the Captain, using both
Atlanta and other Bureau of Prisons institutional staff arriving on temporary
duty(TDY) status to confer all perimeter posts. FBI, U.S. Marshals, INS, and other
law enforcement agency staff assumed other responsibilities relating to the crisis.
12:02 p.m. An extremely dangerous high security released by the detainees from a
secure housing unit, who had previously appeared relatively passive, was now
observed organizing a group of at least 10 Cuban detainees and reportedly was
making plans to "take over!"
1:25 p.m. One of the hostages in the American dorm sent a radio message that the
hostages are all doing well (approximately 30 there) and that the detainees will
consider releasing hostages if representatives of the media were permitted in to speak
with them.
1:30 p.m. A correctional Officer held hostage was released.
2:00 p.m. The Warden held a press conference with news media and described
changing detainee leadership and demands as well as the rationale for not locking
down the institution on Monday morning.
2:45 p.m. An unidentified detainee was heard over Bureau of Prisons radio
threatening to kill the hostages if the Bureau of Prisons, FBI, etc. rush the institution.
Also heard are orders to throw hostages out the window ifhelicopters show up again.
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3:00 p,m. An Operations Control center watch was activated in the Atlanta Executive
Assistant's Office.
4:30 p.m. A teacher held hostage was released after he complained of chest pains.
He was briefly hospitalized and released. Hostages who were released later described
how upset the detainees became when they saw the Teacher being released from the
Hospital so quickly.
5:00 p.m. to 5:40 p.m. Twelve detainees surrendered through East gate. Throughout
the siege, detainees and American inmates continued to surrender at various times and
in varying numbers.
5:45 p.m. Two buses departed with 74 American inmates for Dobbins Air Force
Base, Marietta, Georgia, with a final destination of USP, Terre Haute, Indiana. The
press was advised of the move after the buses left the institution.
5:45 p.m. to 9:55 p.m. Another 41 detainees surrendered through the East Gate.
10:20 p.m. to 10:30 p.m. Regional Director Wilson called the Director's Office to
discuss with the Director whether or not to attempt rescue ofHospital staff.
11:55 p.m. Tuesday, November 24, 1987 Five staff members were released by the
detainees. The hostages were examined and foimd to be in good physical condition,
quickly debriefed and returned to their families.
11:59 p.m. Late evening discussions in Washington D.C., led to appointment of
special teams to handle hostage family issues.
Wednesday, November 25,1987
12:25 am. Regional Director Wilkinson called the Director to advise that five
hostages were released, and that he believed the Hospital had been taken over by
detainees within the last half hour.
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12:33 a.m. A staffPsychologist held hostage was released from the Hospital through
the rear corridor due to a medical problem. He was briefly hospitalized and then
released.
1:15 a.m. News media personnel were permitted to enter the main corridor and
briefly meet with detainee negotiators.
2:55 a.m. An official count showed 1,1314 detainees and 211 American inmates
verified still on the compound.
3:30 a.m. Three recently released hostages asked with the news media. All three
made statements about their treatment but did not answer questions from media
representatives.
11:55 a.m. The Bureau of Prisons' Atlanta Command Center staff decided to cut off
water to provide more water pressure to fight potential fires.
12:55 p.m. A reading file of significant information was established in the Atlanta
Command Center staff decided to cut off water to provide more water pressure to
fight potential fires.
12:40 p.m. Ninety-two Cuban detainees were moved by bus for airlift to the USP,
Lewisburg, Pennsylvania.
2:45 p.m. Twenty Cuban detainees and 20 American inmates were transported via bus
to FCI, Talladega, Alabama.
5:00 p.m. A check point was established at an opaque screen erected in the main
corridor; no one was to be permitted beyond this point without permission of the FBI
or Bureau ofPrisons Command Center, the other was to be notified.
6:20 p.m. Ninety Cuban detainees were moved via bus to airlift for further movement
to FCI, Petersburg, Virginia.
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6:30 p.m. A problem with identification of a hostage surface at this time. The
problem was resolved.
7:25 p.m. Regional Director Wilkinson called the Central Office to again discuss the
option of tactical assault of Hospital.
9:20 p.m. A loud banging noise on the B Cellhouse door to the main corridor was
initially interpreted as being gun fire.
9:35 p.m. Armored personnel carries arrived and staged at the institution pistol range.
Military hostage rescue team arrived to assist with planning and advise on rescue
efforts.
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Thursday, November 26, 1987 (Thanksgiving Day)
12:50 a.m. Reports were received from inside that the Commissary had now been
broken into by detainees and provisions were being removed.
3:05 a.m. The Atlanta Command Center received a call that one of the civilian
contractors working inside before the riot may have left six to seven company walkie-
talkies that the inmates may now be using.
3:15 a.m. Detainees were observed entering the tunnel at the rear of the old Food
Service storage area that leads under the wall to the Powerhouse basement.
6:55 a.m. Staff observed numerous staff hostages moving from area to area. No
restraints were visible on the hostages, which contrasted with earlier sightings.
11:00 a.m. The Director's Thanksgiving message was delivered to hostage families.
Regional director McCime met with the three Cuban-exile advisors.
12:45 p.m. to 1:45 p.m. Attorney General Meese and the Director conducted
telephone conference calls with family members of Atlanta hostages to offer their
support and consolation.
2:05 p.m. One American inmate and 39 Cuban detainees were taken by bus to FCI,
Talladega, Alabama.
4:08 p.m. After establishing the boundaries of their potential involvement and
gaining the confidence of Atlanta Bureau of Prisons and FBI Command Center staff,
the three Cuban-exile advisors were escorted into the institution to assist negotiations.
4:55 p.m. Atlanta TV station news team from Chaimel 5 was escorted into the
institution to film negotiation efforts between Cuban exiles and detainees negotiators.
6:00 p.m. to 9:30 p.m. Negotiations appeared to take a favorable turn as Government
negotiators believed an agreement was reached with the detainees to release 50 of the
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staff hostages in return for all a full press conference with live TV coverage for the
detainee leaders.
11:55 p.m. Thursday, November 26, 1987 Negotiations broke off after efforts to reach
agreement to free the 50 staffmembers failed.
Friday, November 27,1987
2:00 a.m. Staff in the main corridor basement observed detainees attempting to gain
access to the clothing issue area ofReceiving and Discharge (R&D).
11:45 a.m. The mayor of Miami, FL and a group of elected Florida officials, former
Cuban political prisoners, and religious leaders, arrived at UPS, Atlanta and were
escorted to the Regional Office Conference Room for a discussion of their potential
involvement in the situation.
1:45 p.m. An FBI Special Agent from Philadelphia briefed the Miami Mayor and his
group on the progress and status of the negotiations.
4:30 p.m. The Miami Mayor briefed his group as to his meeting with the FBI. The
group drafted a press release and left the Regional Office to meet with the press.
5:00 p.m. Another detainee surrendered through the East Gate and was committed to
A Cellhouse.
9:45 p.m. The Cuban detainees announced that they wanted to have an immediate
meeting of all Cubans who possessed radios. During the aimormcement, one detainee
was excused from the meeting, but no explanation was given.
10:10 p.m. Cuban detainees were observed by staff in towers carrying medicine from
the Hospital to an unknown destination.
10:20 p.m. A Cuban detainee presented a set of seven demands to the Government
negotiators.
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11:20 p.m. Staff in Tower 3 reported hearing noises like a public address system
being tested on the compoimd. Shortly thereafter, Cuban detainees were heard
broadcasting an announcement ofa meeting of all detainees.
11:53 p.m. Staff in Tower 3 reported hearing noises like a public address system
being tested on the compound. Shortly thereafter, Cuban detainees were heard
broadcasting an annoimcement ofa meeting of all detainees.
11:53 p.m. The meeting of Cuban detainees appeared to have broken up and the
detainees dispersed.
Saturday, November 28,1987
12:11 a.m. Following the meeting of detainees, staff in the towers heard detainees
broadcasting over a P.A. system in front of the Chapel. The distortion level was so
great that staffwere unable to translate.
12:50 a.m. Detainees were heard on Bureau of Prisons radios advising all Cubans to
use the hostages to test the water before drinking it themselves.
4:40 a.m. Three detainees surrendered through the East Gate.
6:01 p.m. Regional Director Wilkinson called the Director to report on the status at
Atlanta. He described a meeting held with all agency representatives as excellent for
morale.
6:40 p.m. Detainees were heard on the radios threatening to kill three hostages unless
water was turned back on within 24 hours.
6:53 p.m. The FBI reported a small fire burning in the UNICOR building.
7:30 p.m. Saturday, November 28, 1987 A small fire was observed in E cellhouse.
The fire did not last long and appeared to have been suppressed by detainees.
8:59 p.m. Staff in Tower 10 reported that another fire was breaking out on the second
floor ofE Cellhouse.
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9:00 p.m. Cuban Detainee leaders "broadcast" message over Bureau of Prisons radios
to outside radio personnel.
10:04 p.m. Now it appeared that the fire in the UNICOR building was actually a fire
in the he Education building which is attracted to the UNICOR building.
10:15 p.m. Staff in the towers reported hearing what sounded like gun shots on the
compound. They quickly determined, however, that the source of the sounds were
aerosol cans exploding in the Education building fire.
10:30 p.m. Fires in all areas are reported as either out or merely smoldering.
10:58 p.m. Four Cuban detainees were observed on the roof of the Hospital waving
Flags and shouting toward the groups of people lining McDonough Boulevard, the
street running in front of the institution.
11:00 p.m. The three Cuban-American exile advisors used a public address system to
speak directly to the reluctant faction of approximately 200 radical detainees,
encouraging them to release 50 hostages as a show of faith.
Sunday November 29,1987
12:10 a.m. Cuban detainees announce they are ready to release three hostages as soon
as the telephone between detainees and the Government negotiators is repaired.
12:45 a.m. Four hostages are released by detainees-apparently one hostage from each
faction of detainee leadership. Each hostage reported that they and their fellow
hostages had been well treated, well cared for, and protected from other detainees
who might pose a risk ofharm to them.
7:00 a.m. A video tape of a hostage who was released at 12:45 a.m. was played on
local television in Atlanta. The video tape had been released by the Bureau of Prisons
in lieu of the hostage making direct contact with the news media and being
questioned.
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11:30 a.m. The Government negotiators began to see some development in detainee
leadership, as face-to- negotiations were initiated. The three Cuban American
advisors continued to function as resource persons for the Government negotiating
team. Mail received at the institution for the detainees since Monday was given to the
detainees as a sign of good faith on the part of the Government.
2:28 p.m. Partial water pressure was restored inside the institution after the
negotiators explained that it had been turned off previously to increase water pressure
for fire fighting.
3:34 p.m. Staff at Atlanta received word that all hostages had been released safely
from FDC, Oakdale.
4:11 p.m. Cuban detainees announced a call for a meeting to draft a letter to be sent
to the Government.
6:30 p.m. Face-to-face negotiations renewed between three Cuban exile-advisors,
FBI negotiators, and three Cuban detainee representatives.
7:30 p.m. Negotiations concluded after the detainees were apprised of the terms of
the agreement to end the siege at Oakdale.
7:55 p.m. A copy of the Oakdale agreement was received at Atlanta.
8:00 p.m. to Midnight No further activity of note during the evening.
3:40 a.m. One Cuban detainee surrendered at the East Gate
Monday November 30, 1987
8:15 a.m. Detainees were overheard on the radio, referencing an explosive charge
being in place and ready to explode.
11:40 a.m. There continued to be significant activity in the tunnel, and an FBI SWAT
Team was dispatched, along with five Bureau of Prisons staff, to secure the outside
exit of this area.
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1:32 p.m. The high security American prisoner was observed on the Hospital roof.
2:09 p.m. One of the hostages was seen being taken to the Hospital roof by detainees.
2:15 p.m. This hostage was seen being taken down from the roof.
5:00 p.m. The detainee radio channel 2 was jammed to hamper their internal
communication.
5:15 p.m. The United States Attorney, Bob Barr, arrived at the institution.
5:30 p.m. The three Cuban-American exile advisors, with knowledge of the
Government negotiators, met with the media across from the institution and advised
that their efforts at negotiations had proven unsuccessful and they were, therefore,
returning home.
6:10 p.m. to 7:45 p.m. Two Cuban detainees surrendered at the East Gate.
9:20 p.m. Cuban detainees turned the high security American inmate over to the U.S.
Marshals SWAT Team posted at the door leading to the West Yard from the rear of
the main corridor.
Tuesday, December 1,1987
12:07 a.m. One Cuban detainee surrendered.
12:45 a.m. A physician's Assistant (PA) examined the high security inmate in A
Cellhouse where he had been taken after his release to the authorities; all vital signs
were normal.
3:14 a.m. Four Cuban detainees surrendered at the East gate.
3:55 a.m. A fluoroscope examination of one of the surrendering detainees revealed
the presence of a handcuffkey hidden in his rectum.
7:30 a.m. The high security inmate was taken from A Cellhouse, out the front door of
the institution, to a waiting van for transportation to Dobbins Air Force Base for flight
to USP, Levenworth, Kansas.
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1:40 p.m. Two new detainee leaders emerged and joined the negotiation process.
2:27 p.m. Cuban detainees were observed passing out sheets of paper. They brought
a copy to staff in Tower 3. It was a copy of the Oakdale agreement.
2:45 p.m. While burning material around forklifts, two detainees' clothing caught
fire. One detainee was burned; he surrendered and was taken to an outside Hospital
for treatment.
3:48 p.m. Tower 3 staff reported a fire in the Warehouse behind the kitchen.
4:50 p.m. to 6;35 p.m. Tuesday, December 1,1987 Two Cuban detainees surrendered
to the East Gate.
9:00 p.m. Detainees gathered on the Hospital roof sang "Happy Birthday" to a leader
of the "Coalition to Support Cuban Detainees."
9:15 p.m. A local attorney who had previously represented detainees in litigation
against the Government was allowed to speak again to the detainees and explain the
language of a proposed agreement to settle the Atlanta siege to the detainees'
representatives. He did not participate in the negotiations themselves.
9:48 p.m. A Correctional Officer held hostage was released by detainees in return for
a meeting either the attorney.
10:30 p.m. Detainees continued to used the roofof the Hospital to communicate with
the public and the media primarily through the use of a homemade public address
system.
Wednesday, December 2,1987
12:30 a.m. The UNICOR Building was seen burning again. Numerous fires
(probably for warmth) were observed at several locations around the yard.
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12:45 a.m. After meeting with the detainees, the local attorney complied a list of
questions and concerns the detainees had with the proposed agreement; he presented
it to the Government negotiators and departed the institution.
3:15 a.m. Detainees at rear Duck Mill front report to staff that they have discovered a
body and want a Physician's Assistant and stretcher sent into the compound.
4:15 a.m. After and hour, the detainees had not produced a body. Nevertheless, a
number of detainees were observed carrying a stretcher toward the East Gate for no
apparent reason. Detainees told a staff member they were imable to recover the body
and would return later.
8:45 a.m. Staff probing the tunnel area under the main corridor discovered to their
surprise the detainees had not discovered or disturbed the clothing issue area.
9:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. Discussion between detainee representatives and Government
negotiators continued with the assistance of the cooperating local attorney.
4:30 p.m. Bishop Augustin Roman, Auxiliary Bishop of Miami, expressed a
continued willingness to assist the Government after the Oakdale resolution; this was
an encouraging element in the Atlanta situation.
10:30 p.m. The Catholic Chaplain, who had been held hostage since November 23rd
and was still in detainee hands, presented a petition at the rear corridor. It was signed
by 43 hostages, and requested that no assault be undertaken because the helicopters
flying overhead have the detainees "extremely upset."
Thursday, December 3,1987
12:17 a.m. to 12:35 a.m. Two Cuban Detainees surrendered through the East Gate.
12:36 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. No significant events. Negotiations continued throughout the
afternoon.
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2:09 p.m. Government negotiators reported that Cuban detainees were still
demanding there be no deportations to Cuba.
9:14 p.m. The local attorney returned to the institution and was escorted to the
negotiation site.
9:24 p.m. The Regional Director McCune reports to the Director that the attorney
was meeting with detainee negotiators at that very moment, telling him he and the
Bishop would be the only witnessed to the signing negotiators at that very moment,
telling him he and the Bishop would be the only witnessed to the signing.
9:45 p.m. Bishop Roman arrived via helicopter at the institution and was escorted to
the Regional Office for discussions with Mr. McCune, and then to the institution.
11: 47 p.m. Cuban detainees insisted that the Attorney General, rather than the
Regional Director, sign the agreement.
Friday, December 4,1987
12:04 a.m. Stephen Trott, Associate Attorney General, spoke with a detainee
negotiator on the telephone to assure him that regional Director Gary McCune had
authority to sign the agreement for the Government.
12:06 a.m. The detainees' request to add an additional witness to the signing of the
agreement was approved, and he was permitted into the negotiations.
12:25 a.m. Media teams were escorted into the institution to record the signing of the
agreement and release of hostages.
12:28 a.m. Cuban detainees climbed onto the Hospital roof and announced there
would be a meeting of all detainees in the Chapel area immediately.
12:49 a.m. Certain outside observers were permitted into the institution at the
detainees request as witnesses to the agreement.
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12:54 a.m. Staff in Tower 10 resorted they observed a large group of Cuban detainee
carrying knives and moving toward the AWB building and Chapel. It was not known
at this time whether or not this group was going to attempt to harm the hostages or
prevent their release.
1:00 a.m. The agreement is signed by Regional Director. McCune and detainee
representatives, and witnessed by Bishop Roman and others Live TV coverage of
signing of agreement at Atlanta was broadcast by CNN.
1:09 a.m. Staff in Tower 10 report seeing hostages being brought out of the Hospital
and being moved toward the Dining Room.
1:12 a.m. The first hostages were released and began filing out of the institution.
1:33 a.m. An accurate count of all hostages was confirmed; a;; 89 remaining staff had
been released unharmed.
1:45 a.m. Bishop Roman exited the institution and departed for Miami.
8:30 a.m. to 12:00 Noon Friday, December 4, 1987 Regional Director McCune
agreed, after discussing this issue with the Director, that staff would not begin
processing detainees out of the institution .
12:00 Noon Processing of detainees through the East Gate began and continued for
over 24 hours.
6:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. the Director accompanied Attorney General Meese as he
toured the institution.
Saturday, December 5,1987
1:15 a.m. During the processing of detainees out of the East Gate, a detainee was
fluoroscoped and foimd to have money in his rectum.
5:40 a.m. The detainee removed at 1:15 a.m. died at Grady Memorial Hospital. The
Dekalb Medical Examiner was called.
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8:48 a.m. The last two Cuban detainees surrendered at the East Gate and were
processed out of the institution. No force of any kind was necessary to locate, move




Demands and Promises of Cuban Detainees
Demands:
1. Protection imder the U.S. Constiution.
2. Abrogation of the recent agreement between the Reagan administration and the
Cuban government to return the detainees to Cuba.
3. Judicial review of each individual's case.
4. Immunity from prosecution for the uprising.
5. Psychological treatment for mentally ill detainees.
6. Negotiations with "competent" government officials to take place in the presence of
international news medical.
7. Halfway-house accommodations for detainees with out family or friends in the United
States.
8. Resolution of the detainees' cases under the terms of the 1966 Cuban Reform Act.
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Promises:1.Forgive U.S. Attorney General Edwin Meese and the United States government for
alleged offenses committed against them.2.Not to sue the government if their demands are met.3.Release any hostages whose lives were endangered by sickness.
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